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0.0 Abstract 
 
While economic growth keeps reaching new highs in People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
inequalities and human rights violations are increasing with a matching speed. Minority 
areas continue to be characterized by extreme poverty and social unrest, and despite heavy 
growth rates since the 1990’s, the Tibetan Autonomous Region remains worst off. At the same 
time the PRC has never invested more resources in development projects in the Tibetan 
Plateau. Whereas the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) keeps building more high ways, 
railways and ‘modern housing’ in the name of ‘human development’ in Tibet, more than one 
hundred individual Tibetans have put their own bodies on fire in what appears to be 
individual acts of protest against the CCP rule. Development is a normative and political 
concept, and in many cases imbedded with inexplicit ideological and cultural valuations and 
assumptions. Through qualitative, in-depth interviews with Tibetan refugees recent arrived 
from Tibet now living in exile in Dharamsala, India, this thesis indicate that the practical 
implementation of Chinese development efforts are imbedded with subtle practices of power 
abuses and limited respect and concern for indigenous knowledge. By imposing controversial 
conditions on marginalized Tibetan recipients, this research shows that ‘development’ has 
been actively utilized to further the halting of basic human rights such as freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion in the region. The PRC thus appears to have failed in winning a high 
degree of popular support for its development policies in the Tibetan Plateau. This can to 
certain extent be an explanations why some Tibetans continue to take on the drastic step of 
engulfing their bodies in flames to protest, and to put themselves in grate risks fleeing 
illegally to an uncertain state of refugeehood and exile in Nepal and India. The empirical 
findings of the case of development without human rights in Tibet under the PRC confirm 
Wolfgang Sachs bold statement from the post-development debate in the early 1990’s: “It did 
not work”.  
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Development without Rights?: An Analysis of the Chinese 
Development Policies in Tibet in a Power and Post-Development 
Perspective 
 
“(…)it seems more like the aim of the good facilities and development that comes with the 
Chinese, actually is to make the Tibetan culture, or I mean, our ways of life, our traditions, 
you know, to disappear into the Chinese”. 
“Sonam” 
 (Former political prisoner from Tibet, interview 11). 
1. Introduction 
  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become the world’s fastest growing economy and 
is estimated to become the world’s leading economic power by 2030 (World Bank 2012). 
However, with an annual growth rate of almost 10%, the inequalities of wealth within the 
country seem to be rising with a matching speed (UNDP 2010)
1
. These inequalities have 
reached the extent that the newly accumulated economic wealth and successive development 
boom seem to have affected the country in two diametrically different directions, splitting the 
nation in two distinct geographical units (Goodman 2004, Lu, Ding and Neilson 2004). On the 
one side, the economic and human development in the eastern provinces near the coast is by 
the United Nations compared with wealthy, industrialized European countries like Portugal 
and the Czech Republic (UNDP 2010). On the other side, the least developed regions in 
western China are compared with war-thorn, highly underdeveloped countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (UNDP 2010). 
 In the light of the wide-spread human rights criticism frequently directed towards the 
PRC of its ill-treatment of minority groups like the Mongols, the Uighurs
2
 and the Tibetans, it 
seems inappropriate to ignore that the developed eastern provinces predominantly are 
inhabited by the Chinese Han and Hui majority (Amnesty 2012, USDS 2011, USDS 2012, 
HRW 2010, HRW 2008, HRW 2007). The underdeveloped western provinces, on the other 
hand, have the country’s highest concentration of ethnic minorities, among others, the two 
largest such groups, the Tibetans and the Uighurs (Cao 2009). An independent human rights 
                                                          
1
 The UNDP China report for 2010 is the latest available data accessible to date. 
2
 In the most recent World Human Rights Report by Amnesty International, the Uighurs and Tibetans and their 
respective Autonomous Regions are identified as suffering under the worst human rights conditions within the 
borders of the PRC (Amnesty 2012).  
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NGO, estimates that roughly 80% of the Chinese minority population live in this area (MRG 
2009, Web). The Chinese development processes have therefore been criticized not only for 
increasing the gaps between rich and poor, but also for favouring the ethnic majority areas as 
a potentially discriminatory practise (Cao 2009). Rights groups furthermore suggest that 
“China’s rapid economic transformation has exposed the intrinsic and historical problems of 
the government's policies towards ethnic minorities”, and states that ethnic minorities like the 
Tibetans, Mongols and the Uighurs bear 
 
“(…)disproportionate costs of development and are facing attacks on their cultural identities. 
Their lands are being exploited for gas and oil, and […]increasingly militarized by the PRC 
government, as part of its response against perceived insurgency threats” (MRG 2008, Web). 
 
Despite its rapid economic growth since the 1990’s, the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 
and the other Tibetan inhabited areas, are characterized by lower levels of development than 
any other region within the PRC (Fischer 2012, UNDP 2010). It is therefore interesting that in 
the TAR, the GDP annual growth rate was for many years as high as 12%, far above the 
national average (Fischer 2012). However, Fischer (2012) argues how the high GDP growth 
rates in Tibet can be seen as misleading. That is because they might derive from the excessive 
economic inputs from the Chinese government in terms of direct financial subsidies (Fischer 
2012). By the year 2010, he argues, “(…)direct budgetary subsidies from the central 
government to the TAR local government surpassed one hundred percent of the TAR gross 
domestic product (GDP) (…) ”(Fischer 2012:6). Additionally, investments in fixed assets 
reached 91% of the TAR total GDP in 2010 (Fischer 2012).  
Economic resources earmarked for various costly, prestigious and highly visible 
development projects such as railway construction, high road infrastructure and housing 
construction programs, thus pours into the region as a part of what is known as the Open Up 
the West Campaign. This is a program of development policies which aims at smoothening up 
the inequalities between the eastern and the western regions (Fischer 2012, Goodman 2004). 
Furthermore, in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), what was known as the ‘People-
First’ development strategy was introduced in Tibet. Its articulated aim is to improve the lives 
of poor rural farmers and herders in Tibet in particular (Goodman, Childs and Wangdui 
2010). The current 12
th
 Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) further the People-First strategy, and as 
its core stone lies the Comfortable Housing Program (CHP), which aims at providing ‘safe, 
modern housing’ to needy Tibetans (Goodman, Childs and Wangdui 2010). However, despite 
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enthusiastic self-praises by the CCP of their own success with developing Tibet through 
economic growth, infrastructure and housing facilities, the development projects in the region 
have been criticized for not taking sufficiently use of local labour, construction materials and 
indigenous knowledge, favouring hired workers and materials from mainland China and 
abroad (Fischer 2012). It has also been criticized for violating human rights, for instance by 
forcefully relocating Tibetan nomads and herders into fixed, modern houses against their will, 
and without any kind of compensation (HRW 2007, HRW 2006, Web, HRW 2013, Web). 
At the same time, official Chinese newspapers and statements from Chinese officials 
tend to portray the PRC’s involvement in Tibet as a sunshine story of success. For instance, 
according to the CCP controlled newspaper Xinuanet, by the end of the 11
th
 Five Year 
Progress Plan, the CCP have succeeded ensuring safe drinking water to as much as 1, 22 
million people in the Tibetan Autonomous Region; provided electricity to 1,5 million Tibetan 
farmers and herdsmen; installed phone lines in 85% of all villages; built high roads in 668 
Tibetan townships and towns as well as in as much as 4,222 (80%) of the region’s 
administrative villages; provided postal service systems in 80% of all towns and townships; 
and spent millions of yuan on constructing low-rent houses in Tibet aiming at improving the 
living conditions of low-income families in Tibetan areas, among other things through the so-
called Comfortable Housing Program (Xinhuanet 2010). In 2011, the same newspaper thus 
proudly announced that the Tibetans in Lhasa are “the happiest people in China” (Xinhuanet 
2011, 11
th
 11). The CCP suggests that Tibet: 
 
“(…)is now enjoying a golden era of development, with a growing economy, an evolving 
society, a prosperous culture, a higher standard of living, coexistence among different 
religious and ethnic groups, and a happy working and family life enjoyed by local people” 
(People’s Daily 2013).  
 
It is therefore particularly interesting that since 2011, a wave of as much as 117 Tibetan 
monks, nuns and lay people have taken the drastic step of putting their own bodies on fire in 
what appears to be single acts of individual protests against the Chinese overall involvement 
in Tibet (ICT 2013, Phayul 2013, CNN 2013). There thus seems to exist a great contradiction 
between how the Chinese government interpret and evaluate the current state of happiness and 
contentment among Tibetans in Tibet, and how the Tibetans themselves appear to evaluate 
their well-being.  
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Another clear sign of Tibetan discontent towards the PRC government might also be 
seen in the empirical reality that large numbers
3
 of Tibetans every year put themselves at great 
personal risks by fleeing illegally from Tibet to Nepal or India, sometimes on foot, over the 
mountains of the Himalayas. Although the exact number of refugees leaving Tibet each year 
is uncertain, I argue that this situation rises questions regarding how the term ‘development’ 
adequately is to be understood in the Sino-Tibetan context.  
If the PRC had improved the overall well-being of local Tibetans as they claim to have 
done, through successful development policies, why do Tibetans choose to leave? And why 
have more than one hundred single individuals put their own bodies on fire in what appears to 
be political protests against the PRC? If the PRC had improved the general well-being of local 
Tibetans in Tibet, would it not be logical to assume that overt protests against the CCP’s 
practises, like self-immolations, would have declined and not increased? 
While the self-immolators are calling for greater religious freedoms, the return of the 
Dalai Lama and human rights in Tibet, before engulfing their bodies in flames: the PRC keeps 
building more high roads and railways, more modern houses, and implementing more mining 
projects in the name of development. But what kind of development do we talk about when 
117 individuals have enflamed themselves in protest and desperation? Would human rights 
restrictions diminish single individual Tibetan’s abilities to benefit from large-scale 
development projects on the ground? Or perhaps ‘well-being’ to the average Tibetan person 
necessarily would entail something different than what ‘well-being’ would entail for the 
average CCP official? Is there a possibility that Tibetans would long for a different kind of 
‘development’ as the one assumed beneficial to the Chinese Communist Party and its 
international allies?   
The conventional understandings of the concept of ‘development’ have been criticized 
from a variety of scholars and professionals during recent times (Ziai 2007, Sachs 1992/2010, 
Escobar 1993, Bawtree 1997, Cavalcanti 2007, Nussbaum 2011). Some of the most eager 
such critics can be found among the scholars of the so-called ‘post-development school of 
thought’ (Ziai 2007). This tradition is commonly understood to have been established during 
the early 1990’s, first and foremost through the work by Wolfgang Sachs (1992/2010), Arturo 
                                                          
3
 I have not succeeded in finding the exact numbers of how many Tibetans who flee to India or Nepal annually, 
and the number is highly instable and differs largely from year to year. However, representatives at the Tibetan 
Reception Center (TRC) in Dharamsala estimated that roughly 600-800 refugees had fled annually the latest 
few years, with a declining curve. They stated that the flow of refugees is highly sensitive to changes in the 
Chinese security policies, thus, it has become increasingly difficult for Tibetans to flee since the 2008-
upprisings, after which the PRC severely increased its security measures and political repression in the Tibetan 
Plateau.  
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Escobar (1993) and Bawtree (1997). With its critical emphasis on concepts like discourse and 
power, post-development theory is heavily influenced by poststructuralism and the theoretical 
work by French philosopher Michel Foucault, as well as critical ideas and radical concepts 
borrowed from fields like postcolonialism, environmentalism as well as the emancipatory 
traditions of critical theory developed by the Frankfurt School (Ziai 2007).  
As the Sino-Tibetan relation among other things is characterized by a somewhat 
intense and prolonged political conflict, I argue that it becomes especially important to apply 
a theoretical framework that is sufficiently sensitive to potentially underlying ideological, 
discursive and political power structures in this study. Therefore, in line with the radical 
theoretical tradition of the post-development school of thought, this thesis critically 
scrutinizes the Chinese development processes in Tibet based on the works by Sachs 
(1992/2010), Escobar (1993), and Ziai (2007). Additionally, I also believe that our 
understanding could be further elaborated and broadened up by also taking into account some 
of the findings in the various sociological debates surrounding the definitions, mechanisms 
and functions of the concept of ‘power’. By putting some of the insights drawn from the work 
by for instance Michel Foucault (1986) and Steven Lukes (1976) in connection with the 
insights from the post-development school of thought, I believe we will obtain a useful 
theoretical tool that hopefully can aid us reaching new insights into the Chinese development 
processes in Tibet, and its implications on the ground. My hope is to analyze these theoretical 
ideas in connection to my empirical material. This empirical material consists of personal 
interviews with Tibetan informants, where their experiences, thoughts and reflections of 
development processes are revealed and discussed. Previous research indicates that it is 
unclear “(…) how Tibetans are responding to and being affected by state-sponsored 
development initiatives, or how policies differ from one community to the next and from 
macro-level directives to micro-level implementations” (Bauer, Childs, Craig, Fischer 
2010:7). I argue therefore, that out from a post-development logic where local knowledge and 
indigenous values plays such an important role: research based on empirical in-depth 
interviews with affected Tibetans should be seen as an important contribution to the existing 
literature.  
 By doing that, this thesis seeks to answer the following two research questions: 1) 
based on the experiences and personal experiences of Tibetan arrivals in Dharamsala, to 
which extent, and in which ways, can the exercise of ‘power’ be understood as present in the 
practical undertaking of the Chinese development policies in Tibet?, and 2) To which extent 
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have the Chinese development policies been effective in winning popular support among 
Tibetan individuals, and why?  
This thesis suggests that there seems to exist a predominant perception among many 
recent arrived refugees from Tibet that the Chinese development policies in the region is not 
really aimed at improving the well-being of ordinary Tibetans, but rather to improve the 
Chinese reputation in the international arena. The Comfortable Housing Program and the 
construction of high ways and railroads are seen by many as mere “show off” from the side of 
the Chinese government. In many cases development aid and compensation was offered only 
on political conditions such as signing documents where the Tibetan recipients where to 
confirm that they did not support the Dalai Lama, or that they fully supported the work of the 
Chinese Communist Party. This indicates how ‘development’ can be utilized actively to halt 
human rights such as freedom of speech and religion. Such empirical findings are particularly 
interesting as they necessarily are invisible in development statistics.  
This thesis furthermore shows that a promise of increased economic, cultural and 
social development for Tibet has been one of the main arguments in the official Chinese 
discourse that historically has been applied when explaining and justifying the PRC’s 
presence in Tibet. This includes its military entrance to the territory in the late 1949, namely 
what the CCP terms “the peaceful liberation of Tibet” (CCP 2011).  
This thesis goes as far as to boldly suggest the possibility that the Chinese 
development attempts in Tibet perhaps not appears to derive from a genuine wish to improve 
the well-being of the local population in Tibet, but rather as a political means to continue and 
justify its political grip on this otherwise resource-rich and the geopolitically important 
region.  
1.1 Thesis Outline 
Chapter one elaborates on my research objectives and methodology. After that, a section on 
ethical consideration becomes appropriate, marking the end of the first chapter. 
 Chapter two will present and discuss the multifaceted theoretical framework applied in 
this research project. I will start out with introducing the term ‘development’, and 
problematize different definitions from different critical angels. Then, I will gradually 
narrowing it down to a theoretical discussion on different forms of what is termed ‘power’, 
and end up with a discussion on the post-development school of thought, including its main 
critiques.  
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 In chapter three, I seek to present and discuss a brief literature review, combined with 
a brief historical background for the development processes in Tibet under the PRC.  
 Chapter four presents and discusses the findings of the 20 qualitative interviews that I 
did with the Tibetan recent arrived refugees in Dharamsala during my four months fieldwork. 
Then, I seek to discuss and analyse these empirical findings according to the theoretical 
discussion in chapter two.   
 In chapter five, I seek to pull my concluding remarks and present suggestions for 
further research. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives  
My research objective with this project is not to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the 
overall development processes in the Tibet and its effects on the ground. Although such a 
study would have been a valuable contribution to the existing literature, it would be a far too 
pretentious task for a limited research project like this. Neither is my aim to undertake a 
general analysis of the overall human rights conditions in the Tibetan areas. Several 
independent, high-quality and well-documented contributions with that regards are already 
accessible in the existing literature (US 2011, HRW 2010, HRW 2007, HRW 2008).  
My objective with this research project is two-folded. On the one hand, I seek to 
explore how Tibetans who have chosen to flee from Tibet to India reflect around, and 
understand the current development processes in their respective geographical areas, as well 
to investigate their personal experiences with both development projects and human rights 
violations.  
Secondly, my objective is to analyze the Tibetan interviews according to previous 
literature on the development processes in Tibet under the PRC out from a power and post-
development perspective in particular. An analysis of how the development policies in Tibet 
could be seen as entailing different forms of ‘power’, based on empirical material grounded in 
qualitative interviews with Tibetans remains unexplored not only in Tibetan studies, but also 
in development studies. This study, then, seeks to fill these academic gaps.  
Development policies are too often developed above the heads of the people they are 
meant to benefit. Statistics aiming to measure levels of development have often proved to be 
inadequate methods to evaluate the deeper, empirical effects of development policies on the 
ground (Nussbaum 2011). Furthermore, practical development projects are likely to affect 
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individual households and single individuals in their daily lives, and are in most cases 
gradually implemented through highly multifaceted and complex political processes. 
Therefore, in regions where the human rights violations are as present, large-scale and 
systematic like in the case of Tibet, it seems reasonable to assume that these two political 
aspects interacts and affect each other in a variety of ways. Development does not happen in a 
vacuum. I argue therefore, that it becomes inadequate to analyze the effects and efficiency of 
development merely out from statistics based on changes in averages or other simplifying 
development indicators, measurable in mere numbers and figures. Thus, qualitative in-depth 
interviews with individuals from Tibet who have recent first-hand experiences of practical 
development policies have the potential of shedding particularly valuable insights into the 
effects of development in general, and the intersections between human rights and 
development.  
As I am solely using informants among the Tibetan exile community my approach will 
naturally be from the perspective of Tibetans who flee. I do not, thus, pretend to represent the 
views and experiences of the Tibetan people at large. Any attempt of pulling generalizing 
remarks on how Tibetans as a whole reflect upon, experience or analyze these issues would 
most likely fail as the Tibetan people cannot adequately be understood as one homogenous or 
unified group. On the contrary, due to historical developments as well as the current political 
situation, the Tibetan people are, firstly, geographically divided: one part of the population is 
still in Tibet, while the other part is scattered in exile.  
Table One on the forthcoming page shows how the Tibetan people is divided in 
different categories related to whether they have direct experiences with Chinese development 
processes. As the table clearly shows, there is only one group of Tibetans staying in exile 
whom at the same time have direct experiences of these processes. This is group 1.2.1:  
Arrivals from Tibet. As the table also shows, the group representing the exiles is clearly 
divided in two, I.2.1 and I.2.2. The majority of the exiled population seems to be represented 
in the latter group, namely those who are born in exile and thus have never seen Tibet. It 
would therefore be wrong to assume that this study deals with development from a Tibetan 
exiled approach in general. On the contrary, this project is based on the perspectives of recent 
arrivals from Tibet, currently staying in India. The vast majority of my informants have not 
stayed in India for more than one year.  
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1.3 Table 1) illustrating the Relations between Different Groups of Tibetans 
and Development Practices in Tibet  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
Direct Experiences with the 
Chinese Development Processes 
and Human Rights Violations in 
the TAR 
Direct Experiences with 
the Chinese Development 
Processes or Human 
Rights Violations in other 
Tibetan inhabited areas 
No Direct Experiences with the 
Chinese Development Processes 
or Human Rights Violations in 
Tibet or in Tibetan inhabited 
areas 
 
Note: Table showing different categories of Tibetans and their relations with human rights 
violations and the Chinese development processes in Tibetan areas in the PRC. 
 
1.0 The Tibetan People 
1.1 Tibetans in Tibet 1.2 Tibetans in Exile 
1.1.1 
Tibetans 
in TAR 
1.1.2 Tibetans in 
the Tibetan-
inhabited areas 
outside of the 
TAR. (Kham and 
Amdo) 
1.2.1 Tibetan 
arrivals from 
Tibet 
1.2.2 Tibetans 
born in Exile 
Exile 
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1.4 Research Methods and Research Design 
In this research project I have chosen to apply a qualitative research design and 
methodological approach, grounded on a constructivist epistemological understanding. 
Primary data-collection through fieldwork has been required in this study as the previous 
literature does not currently provide the sufficient information necessary to adequately answer 
my research questions.  
 As my main research methods for primary data-collection I have chosen to conduct a 
number of in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews with recent Tibetan arrivals in the 
Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala. The reason why I have chosen precisely the Tibetan 
community in Dharamsala and not the Tibetan settlements for instance in Nepal or Bhutan, 
which both are countries with a substantial Tibetan refugee population, is because Dharamsala 
is the religious and political centre of the Tibetan exile community worldwide. Both the 
Tibetan Government in Exile as well as the Tibetan people’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, 
have their offices in Dharamsala. Naturally, thus, Dharamsala is the final destination of most 
recent arrivals from Tibet.  
I am well aware that important methodologically questions arise already at the port of 
this choice. It could be argued that many Tibetans who have taken the drastic step to flee from 
China to the main political centre of the Tibetan community in exile perhaps would be more 
inclined to have rather pessimistic views on the Chinese practises and policies to begin with. 
It could also be argued that the politicized environment in Dharamsala might have affected 
the views and opinions of my informants. However, when it comes to the latter issue, I 
believe it is possible to avoid that problem by solely interviewing arrivals who have spent 
very little time in India (maximum one year). In addition, all my informants live relatively 
isolated from the larger exile community where literally all political activities occur (see 
below for details). Furthermore, I do not aspire to utilize a sample representative for the whole 
of Tibet. There are particular reasons why the Tibetans who have chosen to flee to exile is an 
interesting group for my research area. As Table One above shows, this group has recent, first 
hand experiences with both development processes as well as the current human rights 
conditions in the region. At the same time, unlike their fellow Tibetans inside of Tibet, they 
benefit from the relatively safe political context of India in the sense that they can speak 
freely about any topic concerning politics in Tibet without running risks of arrests or violent 
repression. A study like this could hardly been done inside of Tibet due to its politically 
sensitive nature. As I see it, Dharamsala appears to be the only place in the world where this 
particular study could have been undertaken. In addition, this is a particular group which 
17 
 
obviously is discontent about something regarding the situation in Tibet as they choose to 
leave. Precisely because of that, I argue, it is likely that these particular Tibetans have 
reflected and thought about what they are dissatisfied with in Tibet (reasons for fleeing), as 
well as what they hope to get/achieve/experience in India which they do not feel they can 
do/get in Tibet (aspirations for their new life in India). I argue that these appears to be good 
reasons for doing the study in this particular exile community.  
As my overall research design I have chosen a case study design. I believe that the 
case of Tibet in general, and the case of Tibetans who flees from Tibet to exile in particular, 
might prove to be particularly useful in deepening our empirical and theoretical understanding 
of the eventual validity of post-development approach to change, and certain power theories. 
Furthermore, my informants in this research project are all recent arrivals who have 
still not begun their “normal” lives in exile. The majority of these have been interviewed at 
the Tibetan Transit School (TSS) or the Tibetan Reception Centre (TRC) in lower 
Dharamsala. The TRC is a centre for recent arrivals coming either directly from Tibet to 
India, or through Nepal, where they stay for up to one month before they have found an 
occupation in India. The TSS is a school for Tibetan adult arrivals from 18 to 30 years of age. 
There, basic courses are offered for a time span of up to five years, aiming to empower the 
new arrivals to obtain the skills required to function independently in their new, Indian 
society. Both institutions are located a bit isolated from the rest of the Tibetan community 
which primarily is centred in McLeod Ganj, upper Dharamsala. 
Some of the recent arrivals at the TTS and TRC are not merely political refugees in the 
conventional sense of the term, a group which perhaps would be inclined to have particularly 
strong, negative opinions also about Chinas involvements in Tibet, including the Chinese 
development politics. Some of the Tibetans that escape to India are also religious pilgrims, 
searching to see the Dalai Lama or to join the undisturbed activities in the monastic 
institutions throughout the country. Although religious pilgrimage at first glance might appear 
far less dramatic than political refugees who often face immediate threats of arbitrary arrests 
and torture if they do not succeed escaping, the free and undisturbed practise of the Buddhist 
religion is nevertheless often seen as an urgent and absolute necessity for devoted Tibetan 
Buddhists, nuns and monks. Additionally, the monastic institutions are far from disconnected 
from the multifaceted arena of politics. Traditionally in Tibet, there existed no separation 
between religious life and politics. The Dalai Lama himself used to serve as both the political 
as well as the religious head of the state. Monks and nuns also played key roles in organizing 
and participating in the various popular uprisings in the Tibetan Plateau. This is also the case 
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for the on-going wave of self-immolations, where the majority of the self-immolators have 
been monks and nuns (ICT 2012). Although the Dalai Lama now has resigned from his 
political powers, monastic institutions and religious practise continues to be highly politicized 
both within Tibet as well as in the Tibetan exile communities. In a society like the Tibetan, 
where the Buddhist religion has played such a crucial social and political role, I argue that it 
becomes inadequate to understand the leaving Tibet for permanent or temporary religious 
pilgrimage as disconnected from political and human rights considerations in the region. I 
argue therefore that religion in the case of Tibet under the PRC could be seen as a highly 
political matter. Any argument that seeks to diminish the gravity of the situation for 
individuals leaving Tibet for religious reasons, would fail in their understanding of the 
importance and significance of religion in the Sino-Tibetan conflict.  
Other Tibetan arrivals come to be reunited with distant family members, to receive a 
proper education, or simply to seek better opportunities than what is currently available in 
Tibet. In my study, I seek to interview individuals independently of their reasons for leaving 
Tibet.  
The interviews were conducted in English, with a Tibetan interpreter. I utilized a voice 
recorder in the majority of my interviews when my informants permitted it. In cases where 
they did not allow me to record their testimonies, I took notes with pen and paper. In either 
case I transcribed the interviews shortly after the interviews were conducted. That I did in 
order to avoid loss of personal interpretations and expressions transmitted for instance 
through body language, irony, modes of talking and other forms of non-verbal language. All 
the recorded interviews have been carefully transcribed before I started the process of 
analysis. I have chosen to base my empirical research on personal Tibetan interviews as I 
believe that, 
 
“(…) detailed examples can (…) be educative for the reader, who might not be able to imagine 
such different life-conditions without the help of narrative. Narratives help such readers focus 
on a wider range of problems and issues, and also cultivate the imagination, producing an 
acknowledgement of the equal humanity of people whose lives typically are ignored by 
privileged elites. Examples also clarify the theoretical argument by showing exactly how to 
positions differ.” (Nussbaum 2011:81).  
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1.5 Challenges during Fieldwork 
During fieldwork, I experienced both challenges and advantages due to my role as an outsider 
and as a researcher. First of all, I faced practical difficulties in finding suitable interpreters. 
That was not because there is a lack of Tibetans with the required knowledge of the English 
language, but rather because there was a lack of Tibetans who additionally had the required 
proficiency in the multiple Tibetan dialects, some of which differ radically from Central 
Tibetan
4
. 
Furthermore, one could of course argue that it would have been an advantage to know 
the Tibetan language sufficiently well so that I could have done the interviews in the native 
language of my informants myself. However, limitations in time and resources made it 
impossible to obtain such a high level of familiarity with the complex Tibetan language. I am 
also well aware that certain dimensions and nuances in the empirical findings in my 
interviews perhaps could have been lost due to slightly incomplete interpretations, for 
instance in cases where my interpreters were not native Khampa speakers. However, to some 
extent I managed to solve that problem by working with a variety of different interpreters. 
Some of these interpreters appeared to have had a better proficiency both in the Khampa-
dialect as well as in the English language, than others. Furthermore, as I recorded most of my 
interviews on a digital voice recorder, I had the opportunity to verify the validity of the 
translations by showing some of them to close Tibetan friends in Dharamsala who had the 
required proficiency in the respective Tibetan dialects. When doing that, however, I was 
careful not to reveal the identity of my informants in order not to break my ethical promise of 
confidentiality.  
However, having spent as much as roughly five months in the Tibetan refugee 
community for my fieldwork, I believe that I to some extent was able to obtain deeper insights 
into my research topic than what I assume otherwise would have been possible. That is 
amongst other things because it enabled me to spend more time with my informants, some of 
which I got to know quite well, also on a personal level. It also enabled me to go back to 
informants and do follow-up interviews in certain cases. Additionally, as I had already spent 
one year in the community since the autumn 2011, I also feel that I was in a favorable position 
in the sense that I already had several useful contacts; I knew the community very well; and 
                                                          
4
 The Central Tibetan dialect, also known as Standard Tibetan or the Ü-Tsang dialect, function as a lingua franca 
among Tibetans in India. However, inside of Tibet itself, the Chinese language has the role as lingua franca. 
Therefore, many arrivals from Tibet do not speak Central Tibetan, but only local Tibetan dialects. 
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was well-known to a number of Tibetan activists and individuals working in Tibetan NGOs. 
In my experience, I feel that my familiarity with the Tibetan refugee community in 
Dharamsala, as well as with Tibetan culture, customs, traditions and history: made it easier for 
me to gain trust among my informants during, and when scheduling, interviews.  
 One could argue that my previous role as an activist in the community and elsewhere 
could be seen as a deficit in my research project. This could for instance be due to the 
likelihoods of bias and excessive personal identification with some of my informants. 
However, by subjecting my research to thorough theoretical scrutiny, as well as by applying a 
rigorous theoretical framework in my analysis as will be demonstrated in Chapter two, I 
nevertheless argue that I have been able to obtain the necessary intellectual distance to my 
research area, as well as to my informants. Additionally, I will actually go as far as to argue 
that my previous role as an activist in several cases also worked to my advantage.  
For instance, at one occasion, when talking to a former political refugee who had 
previously spent substantial time in Chinese prisons due to human rights activism, it was in 
the initial phases of our conversation, difficult for me to make him open up. He did not seem 
to feel comfortable talking freely to me about his experiences. In my view, he appeared 
skeptical about my motivations for doing the study in the first place. However, after a while, it 
came to a point where I expressed that I felt a certain kinship with the former prisoners 
because I had myself been imprisoned for human rights activism. Not within the borders of 
the PRC like him, but, as I articulated it: “in Israel, another occupying nation”. When that was 
said, his face lid up, and he enthusiastically shook my hand, as if it now had become clear that 
we in a way were fellow peers on a political level, despite of our many differences. The whole 
situation ended up in one of the most personal and profound narratives of political repression 
in Tibet that I had experienced thus far.  
With the exemption of five individuals, all of my informants had their origin in eastern 
Tibet, outside of the TAR. The majority of my informants came from the Kham-region, 
eastern Tibet. However, two of the five informants from within the TAR also came from 
eastern Tibet, more precisely, the city of Chamdo, which is located in a geographic area 
where Kham and the TAR overlaps. It could have been interesting to dig deeper into the 
demography of the Tibetans who flee, scrutinizing potential reasons behind why individuals 
from Kham generally seems to be overrepresented among the refugees in Dharamsala, and 
why there seems to be so few people from Lhasa. However, such a task reaches far beyond 
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the limited scope and aim of this research project. I nevertheless suggest that further research 
seems to be needed in order to adequately discuss the underlying reasons behind this apparent 
tendency.  
In addition to the recent arrivals, I have also interviewed three staff members at the 
Tibetan Reception Center in lower Dharamsala. The purpose of these interviews was to 
broaden up my overall, contextual understanding of the issue of Tibetans who flee. These 
interviews, thus, were dealing more generally with how the wave of arrivals from Tibet has 
changed over time, and what could be the reasons behind this change. They are in that way 
thematically separated from the other interviews, and will thus not have a direct impact on the 
analysis that will be presented later in this thesis.  
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
As the Tibetan refugees are such a marginalized social group in both Tibet as well as in India, 
and because this study deals with highly politically sensitive issues, some remarks on ethical 
considerations are required.  
Stories of family members of exiled Tibetans, who have been imprisoned, tortured, 
sanctioned or monitored by the Chinese authorities as a result of their exiled family member’s 
political activities: flourish among the Tibetan community in Dharamsala. As a result, many 
Tibetans are convinced that the Chinese government bribes Tibetan, Chinese and international 
individuals to provide information about the activities and sayings of the exiled population. 
The freedom in exile is thus often seen is incomplete, and relative to that of Tibet. Although 
the empirical validity of this fear might require more in-depth investigations, many Tibetans 
in Dharamsala nevertheless experience this threat as real and existent. It would be naïve to 
assume that a complex security related context like the one present in the Tibetan exile 
community in Dharamsala would not affect the sayings of my informants.  
Adding yet another aspect to the complexity of the situation, in Tibet itself, spreading 
information to foreigners about politically sensitive issues like human rights violations or 
criticism of Chinese political policies: is associated with extreme dangers. That is because 
such activities frequently are punished under separatist or “splittist” charges by the Chinese 
police, leading to multiple years in prison, commonly with heavy torture, and sometimes even 
“disappearances” or extrajudicial killings (HRW 2012).  
It cannot be taken for granted that the fears of such extreme dangers have been 
embodied to such an extent that some recent arrived Tibetans would modify their critique of 
the Chinese policies when talking to a foreign researcher, even in India. In any case, I have 
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done my best to watch my steps with care, sensitivity and respect in order to assure that I in 
no way might have put my interviewees or their family members in Tibet in any real or 
imagined danger. 
 The principal of informed consent have thus been especially important in this 
particular research project. Furthermore, I cannot be certain that my own activities are not 
being subjected to Chinese surveillance. Therefore, I have put all my efforts into hiding the 
identities of my informants, before, during and after I conducted my fieldwork. 
For instance, I have changed all names of my informants, as well as avoided 
mentioning the names of the villages in which they are from. I did not even write their names 
in my field notes, but referred to their narratives according to the number I gave their 
interviews, and have not sent any of the interviews or the interview notes over the internet.  
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2. Theoretical Framework: 
A Combined Power and Post-Development Approach 
 
I will in this chapter present my theoretical framework, consisting on a discussion of the terms 
‘development, ‘power’ and ‘post-development’. I will here start out with a general discussion 
on ‘development’ and its historic evolvements as I see it directly relevant to my chosen 
research topic.  
Throughout history, there have been many different definitions and understandings of 
the complex, multifaceted concept we know as ‘development’. I argue that in order to 
adequately understand and analyse the implications of the Chinese development policies in 
Tibet, it becomes of crucial importance to first look at the broader context of the historic 
evolvements of development theory and practise in general terms. I will therefore start out 
with a very brief outline of aspects in the history of ‘development’ that I consider of particular 
relevance to my empiric field of research. I seek to utilize some of these historic aspects and 
findings to further advance aspects in the understanding of the development situation in Tibet.  
In the early stages of the history of ‘development’ the mainstream views tended to 
apply an understanding of the term as synonymous with economic growth – measured in GDP 
alone (Nussbaum 2011). However, such traditional ‘development economics’ was later 
heavily criticized for instance by scholars like Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum 
(2000) among other things for ignoring the complexity, multidimensionality and social 
aspects of the concept. In 1990 the UN thus launched its Human Development Reports, 
attempting to broaden up the definition to also include human aspects such as life expectancy, 
health and literacy rates (UNDP 1990).  
With the HDRs, one could argue that human-centred concepts like self-help, 
sustainability and empowerment gained grater resonance in the mainstream approaches 
among the dominant development agents. Therefore, one could go as far as to suggest that 
such apparent change of direction towards a more human-centred development view, could be 
seen as a radical, and even ideologically bold, paradigm shift in what had previously been an 
entirely economy-centred development agenda. However, although acknowledging that no 
given causality exist between growth in GDP and human well-being in itself, the 1996 UNDP 
Human Development Report, still stated that “human development is the end—economic 
growth a means” (UNDP 1996). This, I argue, indicates a continued emphasis in the role of 
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market forces for human development, despite the UNDP’s apparent attempt of broadening up 
the development definition, in resonance with its most eager critics. Therefore, I argue, one 
could perhaps question the profundity of the radicalism in what appeared to be a paradigm 
shift in 1990, and argue that it also can be seen as becoming little but a different way of 
wrapping in an very similar development approach. Furthermore, the logic that economic 
growth would be a mean to human development could even be seen as discursively aligned 
with a political ideology of economic liberalism, and the political ideology of economic 
liberalism, has been heavily criticized by grassroots organizations, rights groups and social 
movements in the Global South for not leading to increased well-being of the poor and 
marginalized, but rather to improve the wealth of the already rich (Smith 2008). 
The most radical changes in the 1990-development-shift were perhaps the 
acknowledgement that policy-measures and political guidelines directed specifically at 
furthering human development, was a perquisite for a causal connection between growth and 
overall increase in human well-being. Although the initial phases of the human development 
approach as manifested in the HDRs in the 1990’s in that way appears not to have represented 
a fundamental turn in the economy-centered approach to development, the new findings did 
nevertheless gain significant influence in the broader development discourse in the 
international development arena. The discursive importance of explicitly acknowledging that 
‘human beings’ was to be understood as the ‘real wealth of nations’ as stated in the HDR of 
1990 should therefore not be overseen. On the contrary, its importance cannot be ignored, nor 
should it be diminished.  
This widening up of the development term later rose new and intriguing question as to 
the degree to which human rights should be considered in the definition. The Human-Rights 
Based Approach to Development (HRBA) thus seems to have become increasingly influential 
in the global development arena, as it was attempted mainstreamed into the United Nation’s 
political system already in 2003 (UN 2003, Web).  
Despite the important contribution to the mainstream understandings of development, 
development economics remain highly influential ‘scholarly wave’ among development 
agencies, governments and professionals today. This is a central argument in Martha 
Nussbaum writings as late as 2011, when she criticized ‘the mainstream approach to 
development’ for in practice still applying that same, old fashioned, economy-centered 
understanding of development where economic growth, measured in GDP plays a major role 
(Nussbaum 2011).  
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However, I do not want to suggest that radical, more ideologically bold, and highly 
critical alternative currencies of thought do not exist in development theory. I have chosen to 
apply a highly critical and multifaceted theoretical approach, which radically differs from the 
‘development as economic growth-approach’ dominating international agencies like the UN, 
the WB and the IMF. My theoretical framework, which will be presented below, combines 
power theory and post-development theory. I believe an interconnection of these theoretical 
perspectives would be the best suitable theoretical framework to adequately answer my 
research questions. Amongst other things, I will use this framework to discuss some of the 
ways in which ‘development’ could be seen as related to different ideas of ‘power’, drawing 
mainly on the work by scholars such as Steven Lukes, Robert Dhal, Bacharach and Baratz, 
and Michel Foucault. 
I have in this thesis chosen to apply a highly critical and multifaceted theoretical 
approach to my study, which radically differs from the ‘development as economic growth-
approach’. My theoretical framework, which will be presented in this chapter, combines 
power theory and post-development theory. I believe a mix of these theoretical trends would 
be the best suitable theoretical framework to adequately answer my research questions. 
Amongst other things, I will use this framework to discuss some of the ways in which 
‘development’ could be seen as related to different ideas of ‘power’, drawing mainly on the 
work by scholars such as Steven Lukes, Robert Dahl, Bacharach and Baratz, and Michel 
Foucault. 
My next section will discuss the importance of not applying a too narrow 
understanding of ‘development’. 
 
2.1 Ethic and Pragmatic Problems of a too Narrow Development Definition 
Theorizing development, I argue, is not only important because its definitions and theoretic 
approaches could become of crucial pragmatic importance at a later stage, but also because it 
might entail implications of ethical importance for individuals and affected communities. The 
ways in which ‘development’ is understood are likely to affect the outcomes of practical 
development projects on the ground, hence it also becomes an ethical matter as it might affect 
the lives of marginalized people in direct and immediate ways.  
Furthermore, while additionally being a highly normative term, commonly seen as 
efforts to improve the economic and human well-being of disadvantaged individual people, 
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marginalized communities, poor households and even entire poverty-struck nations, matters 
of power and ideology furthermore becomes relevant. 
If applying a too shallow, too narrow or a too fluid definition of ‘development’, the 
result might not only be highly ineffective and unsuccessful projects which fail in improving 
the well-being of the people they seeks to address, it could also worsen the living conditions 
of local people and communities. Therefore, theorizing development could be seen both as a 
political undertaking, as well as a highly normative one (See Nussbaum 2011 for further 
elaboration on the normative aspects of development).  
For further elaborating on my point of the potential problems of applying a too narrow 
understanding of ‘development’, let us take the case where the rather old-fashioned view of 
‘development’ as synonymous with economic growth measured in GDP alone, is applied, 
leading to private businesses and governments uniquely emphasising on DGP in their work to 
improve local development. When the ways in which such growth is distributed in society is 
not at all taken into account in the development term, we run the risk of not actually 
improving the material conditions or economic well-being of the very poor and marginalized 
people (that perhaps would be the ones in the most urgent need), or even the average 
population. That would for instance be the case if the reason behind the rise in the GDP was 
that, let us say, the 5% riches people in the country in question had increased their economic 
wealth by 1000% within that year, while the rest of the populations which would not be a part 
of the economic elite, would not have experienced any economic improvements at all. This 
definition would therefore be too narrow, because it fails to consider inequality as a part of its 
understanding. American philosopher and political theorist Martha Nussbaum (2011), is one 
of the main critiques of the approach to development as economic growth.  
Another less obvious example is the case of a country that experiences a high level of 
overall economic growth, combined with a relatively fair distribution of wealth. Materially 
speaking, the country becomes more equal due to the increased growth, which in turn also 
make the GDP rises. We can also add that this country has a 100% employment rate as well as 
nearly 100% enrolment rates in primary and secondary education, as well as offering health 
care to all residents of the country regardless of income, completely free of charge. However, 
let us think that in this same country the human rights conditions are decreasing in the same 
pace as economic development is rising, reaching the point when the human rights conditions 
are so extremely poor that there are no freedom of speech or expression, no freedom of 
assembly or organization, people cannot practises their religion believes or values in any way, 
and all media sources and channels of un-censored information are blocked. Imagine that 
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arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, torture and imprisonments are common practise, or that 
popular participation in politics and decision making is non-existent, while at the same time 
people are not permitted to travel freely, but need special travel permits to visit their own 
family members on different parts of the country, and that all their private communication 
systematically surveyed or monitored by the country’s police, military or ruling party. Could 
we then talk about improved well-being and actual human development? 
The answer to that question is, I argue, a matter of subjective judgement, values and 
even potentially ideological preferences. An advocate from a strict, neo-liberal school of 
thought, where the free market and economic growth is seen as entailing the highest forms of 
freedom and potentially even leading to increased levels of democracy almost by its own 
virtue: would perhaps answer yes to that question. From that ideological logic, one could 
argue that if the average purchase-power and affluence of common people have actually 
increased, and continues to increase, their freedoms are naturally improved in terms of 
material choices, which is crucial to human well-being. In this view one could argue that 
extreme levels of poverty does also diminish human freedoms and agency, in the sense of for 
instance choosing what to buy, what to eat, what to wear, and where to go.  
 Due to the pragmatic and political implications it might entail, theorizing 
development, I therefore argue, could be seen as a highly political task. Therefore, issues of 
power’ should be addressed in our understanding of empirical development processes.  
2.2 ‘Development’ and the One-Dimensional View on Power 
Leading power theoretician Steven Lukes, suggest in his influential and ground breaking 
edition “Power: A Radical View”, that the concept ‘power’, just like ‘development’ should be 
seen as a multifaceted and complex term, distinguishing amongst other things, three different 
dimensions of power (2005[1974]). The first dimension, which gained resonance in the 
academic sociological debates and within the field of international relations, Robert Dahl, 
could be seen as an “(…) intuitive idea of power”, defined simply as: “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Lukes 
2005/1974:16 referring to Dahl). Power, then, is according to this view looked upon as a zero 
sum game that assumes that where A gets more, B gets less.  
As a normative term ‘development’ says something about what “A” and “B”, should 
have, should be able to do, and should be able to be. One hardly disputable ‘should’ within 
the development field could for instance be that people should be able not to die from easily 
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curable diseases. That is a valuation and a presumption which perhaps could be seen as 
related to the emphasis on life-expectancy in the development debate. 
So how could this developmental ‘should’ that normatively would seek to help people 
from dying prematurely be seen as connected with the one-dimensional view on power as 
presented above? Let us take one hypothetic, but yet realistic, scenario. Preventing people not 
to die from easily curable diseases in the 21th century would perhaps require certain 
restrictions on market monopolies on the production of certain medicines so that also poor 
people would be able to afford them.  
In that case, the needs of “poor people”, “A”, would lead to a limitation of the 
economic profits by the rich medical company in question, “B”, who otherwise would have 
enjoyed higher economic gains through market monopoly, which in itself would have 
restricted the ‘power’ of “A” to continue to live without dying from her/his curable disease. In 
that case in is clear that there would have existed a conflict of interests between “A” and “B”. 
Due to the ‘developmental should’ of maximizing life-expectancy as suggested above, one 
could from a normative point of view in line with general development discourse argue that it 
appears more important that, “A”, will not lose his/her life, if it so that it technically could be 
prevented, in this case, through reducing medicine prices by banning the system that enables 
market monopoly, than it appears for ‘B’, a rich medical company, to keep its ‘power’ over 
the lives of “A”. When using this theory of “power over”, I argue, it becomes clear how a 
development policy aiming at abolishing market monopoly on certain medicine in order to 
assure the accessibility of medicine for poor people, would both 1) be a matter of normative 
evaluation of the importance of something (the ability to live) over something else (the ability 
for a rich company to get richer), and 2) a clear conflict of interests over resources which 
implies that where “A” gains more, “B” would gain less, and the other way around. Both 
parties cannot win. Either the medical company manages to keep its ‘power over’, namely the 
monopoly on the medicine leading to higher prices on medicines, which disable the poor 
people to buy it, reducing their ‘power over’ their own lives. Or, the poor people manages to 
overthrow the system which enables market monopoly of powerful medical companies, 
reducing the ‘power over’ that these companies otherwise would inhibit, and by doing that, 
regaining the ‘power over’ their own lives. It is a zero-sum game. 
This leads us to our next power-theoretic scrutiny of how defining ‘development’ 
could entail matters of ‘power’. 
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2.3 ‘Development’ and the Second-Dimensional View on Power 
Defining ‘Development’, certain questions regarding the nature of decision-making and 
development agenda arises. I argue that the way in which we understand development could 
point at certain indications as to who are seen as the appropriate agents to decide how what is 
perceived as the well-being of which people could and should be improved. Should it be 
development experts with university degrees, but which at the same time perhaps are rather 
disconnected from the local realities on the ground? Or should it be local grassroots 
organizations, indigenous community leaders and civil society groups with much indigenous 
knowledge, but perhaps with limited theoretical insights in development scholarship? Or 
should it perhaps be directives and guidelines from centralized organizations like the UN, the 
WB and national governments? Or would the ideal situation perhaps include a mix of all? 
Furthermore, this also arise questions as to which type of individuals should be entitled to 
distinguish and point out the most urgent and acute societal and economic needs to be 
addressed in practical development work? Or in other words, who should decide which issues 
to be put on the political development agenda?  
These questions lead us to what Lukes terms the “two-dimensional power”, developed 
by Bacharach and Baratz (Lukes 1974/2005). Bacharach and Baratz criticized the one-
dimensional view of power by Dahl, as they argued it ignored central aspects of the concept. 
Unlike the one-dimensional approach, they argued that ‘power’ has not only one – but two – 
district ‘faces’, or characteristic features (Lukes 22-23).  That is amongst other things because 
‘power’ also “involves examining both decision-making and nondecision-making” (Lukes 22-
23). Unlike the view developed by Dahl, they thus argued that it is not so that power uniquely 
should be seen as present during overt, observable conflicts of resources at the political 
decision-making table, but also conflicts of interests which do not reach the decision making 
table at all. In that sense, the two-dimensional power of Bacharach and Baratz sheds new 
lights on how to understand ‘conflict’ as it relates to ‘power’. Whereas in Dahl’s view, 
‘conflict’ is restricted to the observable, visible, overt spheres of openly discussed conflicts, 
the view developed by Bacharach and Baratz points out that ‘conflicts’ not necessarily reach 
the point where they are confronted in political arenas. In many cases marginalized people 
does not get a saying in the political process of making decisions on issues that might affect 
them in one way or the other, and that their interest, thus would not necessarily be promoted, 
nor discussed at all. The withdrawal of certain voices in decision making, Bacharach and 
Baratz argue, could for instance be due to 
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“predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’)  
that operates systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the 
expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote 
their vested interests” (Bacharach and Baratz in Lukes 1974/2005:21).  
  
The second face of power, is thus “redefining the boundaries of what is to count as a political 
issue” (Lukes 1974/2005:22-23). According to this view, in sum, power is, in additional to 
Dahl’s intuitive power as discussed above, present when “(…) decisions are prevented from 
being taken on political issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) 
interests (…)” (Lukes 1974/2005:25 referring to Bacharach and Baratz).  
And how could this second dimension of power aid us in our understanding in the 
ways in which defining ‘development’ and practical development work could be seen as 
exercising different dimensions of ‘power’? I argue that the critical debate about ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ within fields like the Anthropology of Development could shed valuable light 
with this regards. 
Within the field of anthropology there is a sub-field called ‘anthropology of 
development’, closely aligned with the post-development approaches to development (Grillo 
and Stirrat 1997). This tradition emphasises how development work in many cases is directed 
from outside forces, and therefore in many cases could be seen as insensitive or even 
indifferent to local culture, traditions and knowledge (Grillo and Stirrat 1997). Emma Creve, 
for instance, suggests that local and indigenous systems of knowledge often are marginalized 
in development processes. She furthermore explains this tendency by suggesting how local 
knowledge in many cases are considered ‘backwards’, and even are reduced to ‘exotic beliefs’ 
or ‘perceptions’ in the view of the development agencies and professionals. She argues, that 
indigenous knowledge in many cases are perceived as of low value compared to the so-called 
‘scientific findings’ of the modern and technological societies (Creve in Grillo and Stirrat 
2007).  
Esteva and Suri Prakash (1998) would perhaps have termed this tendency ‘anti-
democratic’ as they in their radical work criticizes what they call “the Global Project”, namely 
the project of universal ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ as synonymous with a mix of a 
western style political democracy, combined with economic liberalism and free market 
economy. Such a one-size-fits-all type of modernizing, they argue, is “subordinating local 
autonomy to the design of the centralist modern democratic state. The “Global Project” is 
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attempting to further dissolve and destroy what still remains of the (…)democratic commons” 
(Esteva and Suri Prakash 1998:153).  
 I argue that, when combining the lessons learned from the new insights on what 
‘power’ might entail as developed by Bacharach and Baratz, with the critical insights drawn 
from the debates on ‘indigenous knowledge’ within the field of critical development, and 
anthropology, we might reach new insights into our understanding of the development 
concept. When indigenous knowledge and local opinions are denied access to the decision 
making table when developing development policies and undertaking practical development 
processes, I argue that the second dimension of ‘power’ should be seen as being present.  
 
2.4 ‘Development’ and the Third-Dimensional View on ‘Power’ 
Although the idea of power was radically broadened up from the one-dimensional view on 
power to the second dimensional view of power, Steven Lukes still argued that the 
understanding thus far was too narrow and limited to give a comprehensive understanding of 
the term. One of the main challenges, he suggested, was that the one and two-dimensional 
views of power only included known and consient conflicts of interests, solely including 
decision-making processes and nodecision-making processes alone. Furthermore, Lukes 
argues that ‘power’ could certainly be exercised outside the arena of making decisions too. 
Additionally, in the empirical world, oppressed and marginalized groups might have interests 
in social, economic or political change without being aware of it, for instance due to restricted 
access to information and knowledge on alternatives to the existing situation. He suggests that  
 
“The second reason why the insistence on actual and observable conflict will not do is simply 
that it is highly unsatisfactory to suppose that power is only exercised in situations of such 
conflict. To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he 
does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants” (Lukes 1974/2005:27).  
 
He suggests that “the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires 
you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and 
desires?” (Lukes 1974/2005:27).  Criticizing both the work of Dahl and Bacharach and 
Baratz, for only addressing actual conflict when defining and discussing the faces of ‘power’, 
Lukes  argues therefore that power has not only two, but three, dimensions. The most 
effective forms of power, he argues, is present when potential conflicts of interests are 
32 
 
prevented from arising at the first place. In that sense, Lukes third dimensional power is 
present when individuals accept their situation without question or feelings of grievances or 
discontent, so that ‘conflict’ in that way never occurs. The Marxist idea of false consciousness 
may in that way be seen as crucial to the three dimensional power. That, I argue, is 
problematic in itself because it opens up for the possibility that someone else but the 
oppressed and marginalized can claim to know what is in the real interest of the people in 
question. Lukes ‘radical view’ on power thus addresses “(…)the many ways in which 
potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and 
institutional practices or through individual’s decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the 
absence of actual, observable conflict”, where there nevertheless exist a “(…)latent conflict, 
which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real 
interests of those they exclude” (Lukes 1974/2005:28).  
 
2.5 Michel Foucault and Discursive Power: The ‘Development Consensus’ 
However, French philosopher Michel Foucault goes one step further in his attempt of opening 
up the understanding of power, emphasizing the sophisticated relations between power and 
what he sees as knowledge, or commonly accepted truths, in society. In his view, this form of 
power is thus intrinsically connected to ‘discourses of truth”, as he calls it, pointing out a 
power that is hidden, invisible and omnipresent. This kind of ‘disciplinary power’ or 
‘discursive power’ nevertheless directs the behavior, sayings, choices and reactions of 
individuals in almost absolute and inescapable ways (Foucault 1986:229).  
Foucault thus defines the what of power according to how it works. He suggests for 
instance that power “(…)produces “subjects”, forging their character and “normalizing them”, 
rendering them capable of and willing to adhere to norms of sanity, health, sexuality and other 
forms of propriety” (Lukes 2005[1974]:91 referring to Foucault). In that way, Foucault 
distinguishes a form of power which is discursive, meaning, how a general, overall way of 
perceiving, understanding, thinking, experiencing and talking about certain aspects of society: 
represent a covert form of power. Such discursive power shapes; controls and restricts: human 
behavior.  
 This can be seen as a form of domination which operates when people unreflectively 
subordinates themselves to the ‘regimes of truths’, or discourses. These can for instance be 
understood as the normative or hegemonic perceptions of acceptable behavior created for 
example by the fear of punishment. Punishment can here be understood both in terms of 
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social as well as physical sanctions (Foucault 1980/1976 in Lukes 2005/1974). Now, how can 
Michel Foucault’s teachings on disciplinary power or discursive power aid us in our critical 
scrutiny of development? 
Cavalcanti, argues that  
 
“Despite all the criticism that has been levelled against it, the term 'development' is still used almost as 
though it were entirely unproblematic. Development insists on staying in our vocabulary, and many 
people seem to believe that a world without the 'modernisation' concept of development simply cannot 
exist” (2007:85).  
 
This kind of development consensus can be seen as the same as what Escobar terms the 
“unquestioned desirability” of development (Escobar 1993:vii).  
At the same time, several critical scholars have highlighted cases of development 
which have worsened the well-being of the local population instead of improving it. For 
instance, while analysing an empirical case of a development project from rural Brazil, 
Cavalcanti (2007) goes as far as to pose human well-being and ‘development’ up against each 
other as two opposites. In the empirical case she addresses ‘development’ fails among other 
things because the local culture; knowledge; needs and wishes: were ignored, or even 
discredited from the side of the development agencies. Few goes as far in their critique as 
Cavalcanti, who, in the choice of title of her work, clearly illustrates the boldness of her 
arguments: “Development versus Enjoyment of Life” (Cavalcanti 2007).  
Could what appears to be a taken-for-granted normative consensus assuming 
modernization’ and so-called ‘development’ to be a good necessity  that thus should be 
implemented in the so-called ‘developing countries’ be seen as a Foucaultian ‘discourse of 
truth’, and thus be rendered a matter of discursive power? 
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2.6 Post-Development: Development Alternatives versus Alternatives to 
Development? 
“(...)the idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and 
disappointment, failures and crimes, have been the steady companions of development and 
they tell a common story: it did not work.  
 
(Sachs 2010:XV). 
 
So based on the discussion above, I argue that it becomes adequate to apply an approach to 
the mere concept of development which is sufficiently sensitive to ‘power’. This becomes 
important in order not to run the risk of reinforcing destructive, and potentially oppressive, 
power structures and political ideologies in society.  
  Within the emancipatory tradition of critical theory and the Frankfurt school, post-
development theory evolved out from post-structuralism, and is heavily influenced by the 
work of Michel Foucault (Escobar in Ziai 2007, Nederveen Pieterse 2000). In his 
comprehensive work “Exploring Post-Development”, Aram Ziai presents a collection of 
articles providing a nuanced discussion of the scholarly developments of this radical school of 
thought, as well as its main critiques (2007). Three major academic works are pointed out as 
the most influential in shaping and establishing post-development theory as a critical sub-field 
within Development Studies. These are the “Development Dictionary” by Wolfgang Sachs 
(1992), “Encountering Development” by Arturo Escobar (1995), and “The Post-Development 
Reader” by Rahnema and Bawtree (1997). 
The work by Sachs (1992) became highly influential in the development debates 
during the 1990’s, and posed development based on modernization and industrialization as a 
contradiction to ecological sustainability, going as far as to announcing the end of the 
development era. The development project, he furthermore stated, had proven to be an 
empirical failure, amongst other things because the gaps between rich and poor in the world 
had only become wider and wider since the “development era”, as he called, began in the late 
1940’s (Sachs 1992[1992]). Therefore, the term “development” should be seen as a 
misconceived concept, which in addition to leading to increased inequality and injustice, also 
had been leading to an elimination of cultural diversity, a process directed by universalizing 
western institutions, powerful governments and western development agencies. And as the 
most basic promises of the development project had failed, he called for an abolishment of the 
mere concept itself: “time is ripe to write its obituary” (Sachs 2010[1992]:XV). Sachs’ 
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critique, I argue, was thus bold, radical – and merciless. Scholar Nederveen Pieterse 
(2000:175) thus argues that post-development could be seen as a “radical reaction to the 
dilemmas of development” and that its interest lies in scrutinizing the “underlying premises 
and motives of development”.  
Another influential post-development scholar is the American-Colombian social 
anthropologist Arturo Escobar, who, in his work from 1995, turns the development discourse 
up-side-down, by, even more explicitly than what Sachs had previously done, dismissing the 
concept of development altogether (Escobar 1995). He suggests that unquestioned and 
underlying political and ideological presumptions of western cultural superiority generally 
tend to dominate the mainstream development discourse, and analyses this in relation to 
colonialism. That is because the development discourse is seen to have emerged right after the 
Second World War at a time where nations who had recently been colonized by western 
powers for the first time proclaimed self-determination: instead of seeking profound 
emancipation for the newly independent former colonies, the new hegemonic paradigm 
shifted from that of colonialism to that of ‘international development’. The development 
discourse is in that way understood to have taken over where colonialism ended, disguising 
the desires of the western powers to expand and sustain its hegemony under the noble, 
normative discourse of poverty-reduction, industrialization, and modernization: 
‘development’. 
In line with a Foucaultian theoretical tradition, this work interprets the mere concept of 
‘development’ as a powerful knowledge-producing discourse that often results in the exercise 
of power over what is seen as the socially constructed ‘Third World’. Escobar furthermore 
argues that even the more critical development approaches tend to shape their critiques within 
that accepted discourse. In his work, Escobar established that the post-development school 
operates outside of the established development discourse and its discursive power, and does 
thus not deal with searching for new and better development alternatives, but rather: 
alternatives to development.  
Ddevelopment could thus be seen as the furthering of a racist, derogative and colonial 
discourse, presented under a new, and more socially accepted ‘wrapping’. To build up such a 
controversial claim, he looks at the evolution of development in a historical perspective, by 
among other things pointing out that the international development project began at the same 
time as colonisation was abolished and former colonies for the first time had gained their 
apparent independence. While revealing the political and discursive similarities between the 
new development agenda and the colonial practises towards the former colonies of the 
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western powers: Escobar highlights the need to look far beyond this new dominant discourse 
of development that indirectly keeps justifying the subordination of ‘developing countries’ to 
their previous colonizers, and look for radical alternatives to the existing. A clear post-
colonial approach to development had thus been established as an explicit component in the 
post-development school of thought.  
 “The Post-Development Reader” By Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) argued that the 
traditional understanding of development in many cases can be seen as a threat to people’s 
autonomy, and as an ideology born in the North with the underlying motivation of expanding 
the economic and geographic influence:  
 
“The hidden – yet clear – message that every development project has carried out to the people 
at the grassroots has been that their traditional modes of living, thinking and doing have 
doomed them to a subhuman condition (…) Rehnma 1997 in Ziai 2007:16).  
 
They furthermore argue that post-development today should be seen as a new rational for 
social change, and cannot be mistaken for an approach dismissing new possibilities of change.  
 Although there seems to be a lack of solid, comprehensive and clear-cut definitions of 
what post-development is, on the basis of the above mentioned discussion, my understanding 
of the term can be summarized as the following: post-development approaches are highly 
critical views of development, which radically differs from the mainstream approaches to the 
term, political development practices, as well as its mainstream critiques. It understands 
development in historic connection to colonialism, and aims at revealing underlying 
discourses of political, economic, cultural and social forms of oppression, inequalities and 
structural injustices of the development project. Influenced by postcolonialism and post-
structuralism, post-development largely emphasizes the importance of indigenous traditions 
and local knowledge systems applied on grassroots levels in the South. This opens up for the 
possibility that the western-style modernization, industrialization and so-called ‘development’ 
might cause more harm than good, especially when imposed from outside forces. These could 
be international development agencies, powerful governments and other westernized 
institutions. Post-development tends to be rooted in southern scholarship, and sees human 
well-being as intrinsically connected to human dignity, free will, choices and human agency. 
Any kind of the forceful imposing of values, projects, or political change is seen as 
contradictory to human well-being and social justice. Post-development sees traditional 
development as a contradiction to social justice, and as a destructive discourse of political, 
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social and economic control, developed and imposed by the powerful few (strong powerful 
governments, former colonial powers, often western powers) upon the powerless many (the 
Global South, former colonies, marginalized indigenous peoples).  
Merciless as it appears in its critique, the eager opponents of the post-development 
school of thought have, naturally some might suggest, also been numerous, merciless and 
bold in their counter critiques (Ziai 2007). One of the most eager of these critics can be found 
in the work by Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s from 2000. At the same time he is acknowledging the 
usefulness of the post-development school of thought as a philosophical tool enabling 
reflexive and critical thinking and articulation of a philosophy of social change. However, he 
also argues that post-development is based on “flawed premises”, as it fails in offering any 
real alternative to development, despite its claims of doing precisely that. Thus, he argues, it 
falls into a “rhetorical gridlock” of unconstructive anti-ism (Nederveen Pieterse 2000:188, 
187). He furthermore criticizes the post-development school of thought for applying a too 
faithful reliance to post-structuralism, the idea of discourse and the work by Foucault, which 
in his view “invites to political impasse and quietism” (Nederveen Pieterse 2000:187). Last 
but not least, he argues that post-development represents little but a “neo-traditionalist 
reaction to modernity” which romanticize the traditional, pre-modern, and takes its normative 
superiority for granted (Nederveen Pieterse 2000:187). He furthermore states that “Post-
development’s source of strength is a hermeneutics of suspicion, an anti-authoritarian 
sensibility”, but fails to convert this sensibility into political construction (Nederveen Pieterse 
2000:187).  
Despite the critiques by Nederveen Pieterse and others, I still argue that many of the 
thoughts and ideas represented in the post-development school of thought could be utilized to 
deepen our understanding on empirical realities like the development processes in Tibet under 
the PRC.  
I am well aware that it might be perceived a bold choice grounding my master thesis 
research on such radical and, in many ways contested, theoretical approach. However, despite 
of its many enemies, the post-development school has also had a serious impact on the 
academic discussions on international development issues that arose during the 1990’s (Ziai 
2007). While I here humbly suggest that there seems to be little doubt that some of the 
counter-critique posed by Nederveen Pieterse above appears to be valid to a certain extent and 
solidly grounded, I still argue that a post-development theoretical approach might prove to be 
a particularly useful tool in order to understand the development processes in Tibet under the 
PRC. While Sachs perhaps went too far in his critique by arguing that “(…) development has 
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become outdated” and that “It is time to dismantle this mental structure”, he also suggested 
that “The authors of this book consciously bid farewell to the defunct idea in order to clear 
our minds for fresh discoveries” (Sachs 2010[1992]:XV). It is within the framework of these 
“fresh discoveries” I have chosen to ground this research project.  
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3. Literature Review and a Short Historical Background 
 
In this chapter I will present a short literature review of previous research in the field of 
development in Tibet, followed by an historic outline of the main evolvements of the 
development processes in the region.   
As the skilful, well-researched and nuanced analysis by John Powers (2004) clearly 
argues, the existing research on the historical developments of the Sino-Tibetan relation is 
characterized by highly disputed interpretations, views and arguments. Much of the research 
tend to be based on politically biased, emotionally charged and poorly referenced claims, 
statements and assumptions (Powers 2004). Others again, show how it in many cases can be 
challenging to do research on matters related to Tibet, among other things because the use of 
official Chinese statistics related to Tibet, tends to be problematic, incomplete and even 
misleading (Dreyer in Sautman and Dreyer 2006, Fisher 2005).  
At the same time, much of the research coming from Tibetan Dharamsala-based 
organizations or the Tibetan exile government also tends to be rather uniform in their 
understandings and analyses, to the extent that we can talk about a ‘Dharamsala consensus’. 
Sautman and Dreyer go as far as stating that “[v]irtually every aspect of state-society 
interaction in Tibet has been contested by the principal parties – the Tibetan exiles led by the 
Dalai Lama and the PRC government led by the Chinese Communist Party, CCP” (in 
Sautman and Dreyer 2006:3). Due to the severe restrictions of civil and political rights, such 
as freedom of expression and assembly, Tibetans inside of Tibet, on the other hand, have little 
or no political ‘voice’ of their own. 
However, the two sides differ in radical ways for whereas the PRC operates within an 
authoritarian communist dictatorship, which, as is confirmed by various independent human 
rights groups, does not legally permit dissenting or independent opinions, or published 
material on political or historical matters: the same cannot be said about the Tibetan 
community in exile.  
The CCP sees itself as to have saved the Tibetans from a barbaric and medieval 
society lead by the Dalai Lama together with a small, privileged monastic aristocracy, 
Tibetans themselves sees the Chinese entrance into their land as a brutal, military invasion 
(CCP 2011, CTA 2012, Web). Independent researchers, on the other hand, struggle to avoid 
what can be seen as politicized language in their descriptions of the evolvements in the Sino-
Tibetan history, in many cases by using attempted neutral expression like ‘the entrance of 
Chinese troops’.  
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This chapter does not seek to give a comprehensive presentation of the extremely 
complex and problematic scholarly debate on the historic evolvements of the Sino-Tibetan 
relation; conflict; or claims over territory. On the contrary, my hope is to reach a broader 
understanding of how the historic development processes in Tibet under the CCP rule.  
This chapter will be divided in two distinct sub-chapters. The first component will 
present a short literature review on the existing trends in the literature, directly related to the 
development processes in Tibet in particular. Doing that, my aim is not to provide an absolute 
and comprehensive presentation of all relevant literature on the topic. That would clearly be a 
far too pretentious task for such a small research project like this. I will then present a short 
historic background, outlining the main evolvements in the Tibetan development processes 
under the PRC.  
3.1 Literature Review:   
With few exceptions, the majority of the country’s ethnic minorities lives in the 
underdeveloped western regions. The wealthier eastern states near the coast, on the other 
hand, are predominantly inhabited by the ethnic majority groups, Han-Chinese and the Hui-
Muslims. Despite this empiric reality, limited research has addressed the Chinese 
development policies out from an ethnic minority perspective in particular. One reason for 
this limitation, I argue, could be due to the deficits characterizing the available statistics on 
the Chinese development and economic status, currently failing to include provincial 
differences within the larger geographical regions within the PRC. As a means of measuring 
levels of development, such statistics fails to divide each researched unit according to ethnic 
lines. Therefore, potential inter-regional ethnic patterns of racial favoring, tendencies or even 
discrimination, remain unrevealed. This deficit is peculiar considering the notorious 
reputation that the PRC has when it comes precisely to the treatment of its many minority 
groups, known for being discriminatory in a variety of areas (Amnesty International 2012). 
This critique has been made particularly explicit when it comes to the Uighurs, the Mongols 
and the Tibetans (Amnesty International 2012).    
Where academic research fails to analyze the Chinese development inequities out from 
an explicit minority perspective, independent human rights reports might naturally fill in the 
gap. An independent report commissioned by the two international human rights NGOs, the 
Minority Rights Group International and the Human Rights in China, addresses precisely the 
overall situation for the country’s minority population, making explicit references to the 
Chinese development policies (MRG and HRIC 2007). The report suggests that the policies 
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are leading to “[i]nequitable and discriminatory development” (MRG and HRIC 2007:2). 
Furthermore, the report also argues that  
 
“China’s rapid economic transformation has not improved the lives of ethnic minorities 
overall. Instead, there continue to be sharp inequalities in basic social services, such as 
education and health, while income and unemployment comparisons show that persons 
belonging to ethnic groups fall behind national averages and those for Han Chinese. The costs 
of inequitable development are high for those living in rural areas, and political exclusion from 
the process means that solutions are not necessarily made in the best interest of local ethnic 
minorities. The Western Development Strategy (WDS), targeting the western provinces and 
autonomous regions, is intended to ‘modernize’ these areas and narrow the development gap 
between the interior and the wealthier coastal provinces. Given the potential for discontent in 
such inequitable situations, however, the WDS is widely seen as a political tool for 
strengthening national unity through ‘common prosperity’. Its official development goals are 
undermined by three unspoken but overarching objectives—resource extraction from the 
borderlands to benefit the coast, assimilation of local ethnic minority groups through Han 
Chinese population transfers to the autonomous areas, and the alternate purpose of 
infrastructure development for military use. These policies and the failure of the government 
to address the resulting inequalities and discrimination contribute to the violations of human 
rights for ethnic minorities” (MRG and HRIC 2007:2). 
 
However, Cao (2009) and his edition “Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development in Asia”, 
seems to be the only more substantial academic exemption with the attempt of analysing 
development efforts in a particular minority perspective, however with an emphasis on Asia at 
large. His work offers a useful collection of high-quality scholarly articles of which the 
majority are addressing the development processes in some of Chinas Western minority 
regions, amongst others, Tibet. However, the work does not offer a comprehensive ethnic 
analysis of the overall development status and process imposed by the CCP at large, and is for 
the most based on single case studies. Unlike most other literature on the effects of the Open 
Up the West Campaign, he applies primarily social and ethnic approaches to the Chinese 
development of the western regions and goes far in criticising the empirical outcome of these 
policies on the ground. His critique indicates a failure in the Chinese development policies of 
reaching a more equal society. A similarly critical suggestion is confirmed by the most recent 
UNDP China report, arguing that the Chinese  
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“[…] policy efforts have not narrowed the gap between the eastern and the western provinces. 
Poor communities left untouched by economic growth are now widely dispersed across China, 
particularly in the western regions of the country” (UNDP 2010:2). 
 
As a means to coop with the growing disparities in the levels of development between the 
eastern regions and the western, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched the Open Up 
the West Campaign in the year of 1999. This campaign affected the TAR and other Tibetan 
inhabited areas, as well as other western provinces within the PRC. 
 An increasing amount of academic literature has emerged on the Open Up the West 
Campaign. Goodman’s “China’s Campaign to “Open Up the West” consist of a number of 
high-quality academic articles that addresses different aspects of China’s Western 
development, largely from local perspectives, and grounded on solid empirical fieldworks 
(Goodman 2004). Lu and Neilson’s “China’s West Region Development: Domestic Strategies 
and Global Implications” provides a series of articles presented at a Canadian conference in 
2003 written by the World’s most leading scholars, development practicionars and 
governmental officials working on the topic in and outside of China (Lu and Neilson 2004). 
The work “Developing China’s West: Critical Path to Balanced National Development” by 
Yeung and Shen (2004), published on the Chinese University Press, on the other hand, 
provides perhaps a less nuanced or diverse collection of articles on the topic, but may 
nevertheless serve as a useful account reflecting the more mainstream, official Chinese 
understandings of the development processes in the Western regions.  
The current development status of the TAR and other Tibetan areas must be seen in 
relation to the overall Open Up the West Campaign in China. However, few comprehensive 
studies have been done on the overall development processes in Tibet and Tibetan areas in 
particular. One attempt have been the edition “Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, 
and Society in a Disputed Region” edited by Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (2004), 
which covers aspects of the economic transitions in the region, as well as other related issues, 
both in Tibet and in the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala. However, this volume fails 
to include narratives of Tibetans who have experienced the Chinese development processes 
themselves, and largely applies a macro-political perspective in their analyses.  
Among researchers dealing particularly with the economic aspects of development in 
Tibet and how it relates to the Chinese economic development processes at large, economist 
Andrew Fischer is perhaps the most well-known and influential scholar (Fischer 2012, Fischer 
2008, Fischer 2009, Fischer 2010, Fischer 2002). For instance in his work, “Poverty by 
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Design: The Economics of Discrimination in Tibet”, he presents a useful critique of how he 
sees the economic programs in China to have led to increased marginalization of Tibetans, 
despite its promises of the opposite (Fischer 2002). Furthermore, he argues that the PRC are 
using their promises of development in Tibet as a means to justify their human rights 
violations, rather than to improve the well-being of Tibetans (ibid.).  
A more recent work on development in Tibet is “Development Transitions: Land, 
Labor and Social Policy in Tibet”, edited by the leading Tibet scholars Kenneth Bauer, 
Andrew Fisher, Geoff Childs and Sienna Craig (2012), a collection of some of the most up-to-
date research related to development in Tibet, including for instance how the socioeconomic 
changes over time affects the Tibetan nomadic practices.  
Despite the usefulness and high quality of most of the above mentioned contributions 
to the existing literature, there has not been done any study on the overall Chinese 
development processes in Tibet out from an elaborate and multidimensional power, or post-
development perspective. Although Norwegian-Tibetan scholar Tashi Nyima (2010, 2010, 2, 
2009) clearly applies a strong emphasis on discourse when analysing the development 
processes in Tibet, his research fails to apply a broader and more comprehensive post-
development theoretical critique in his works. Furthermore, Goodman’s article “The Politics 
of the West: Equality, Nation-Building and Colonisation, appears to be the only existing work 
that resembles the critical tradition of the post-development school of thought to the extent 
that he uses the word ‘colonisation’ when describing the development in the minority areas in 
the West, Tibet included (Goodman 2003, Goodman 2004).  
 
3.2 Development in Tibet under the PRC: A Historical Background 
“Tibetans have walked out of an old life which was dark, backward, uncivilized, poor and 
closed, into a new life which is bright, modern, civilized, economically prosperous and open, 
resulting in earthshaking progress”. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CCP, Web)  
The first stage of development in Tibet under the PRC is commonly seen to have begun with 
the entrance of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces into Tibet in 1950, with what the 
CCP terms ‘the peaceful liberation of Tibet’ (Dreyer 2004). The desire to push forth 
development appears to have played a central role in the rhetoric’s the PLA applied for 
legitimizing their entering to the region. Thus, the CCP, in their anniversary report, describes 
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this historic event as ”(…)an epoch-making turning point in the social development history of 
Tibet, and a milestone marking the commencement of Tibet's progress from a dark and 
backward society to a bright and advanced future” (CCP 2011). However, this approach to 
social change was not unique for Tibet. Mao Zedong applied a strategy which embraced 
modernity and dismissed tradition in his overall political work within the borders of the PRC.  
As the introductory quote above indicates, the Chinese official interpretation of its 
involvement in Tibet tend to be grounded on an attitude that sees the ethnic Tibetans as 
socially and culturally backwards, simple and uncivilized. What appears to be an assumed 
inferiority of Tibetans and the traditional pre-Chinese Tibet is commonly contrasted with an 
image that praises what is seen as ethnically Chinese: the ‘modern’, the ‘scientific’ and the 
‘developed’. Furthermore, the promise of developing Tibet as a reason for invading it appears, 
when looking at the Chinese Communist Party’s official reports: to have been accomplished 
with outstanding results. A recent report celebrating the Chinese presence in Tibet since the 
signing of the historic 17-point agreement in 1952 after the invasion of the PLA troops, states 
that the CCP involvements in Tibet from then until today has:   
“(…)promoted economic, social and cultural development, created a new social atmosphere of 
modern civilization and progress, produced a far-reaching influence among people of all 
walks of life in Tibet, ended the long-term isolation and stagnation of Tibetan society, paved 
the way for Tibet's march toward a modern society, opened up wide prospects for Tibet's 
further development and provided necessary conditions for the common progress of Tibet and 
the nation as a whole.” (CCP 2011:14) 
Regardless of how the CCP’s involvements in Tibet since 1950 should and could be evaluated 
from normative, positivist or post-development approaches, little doubt remains as to whether 
or not there appear to be a direct connection between a Chinese promise of ‘development’ in 
Tibet and the Sino-Tibetan conflict over territory. The initial phase of Tibetan development 
under the PRC was characterized not only by militarization, but also of a massive investment 
of road and infrastructure construction (Dreyer 2004).  
The second stage of development in Tibet can be seen as to have begun with the defeat 
of the Tibetan army in 1959, when roughly 80 000 Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, fled to 
India. The PLA’s successive policies of the “democratic reforms” were introduced, and led 
amongst other things to a massive increase in the production “of virtually all goods” (Dreyer 
in Sautman and Dreyer 2004:131). Despite this, the Tibetan economy continued to rest upon 
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animal husbandry and agriculture, as it had done before the PLA entered Tibet ten years 
earlier.  
 The “communes” was introduces in China as early as in 1959, but in Tibet they are 
estimated to have been introduced as late as in 1965. As elsewhere in China, the communes 
lead to massive redistribution of private property from rich individuals, monasteries and 
institutions to poor workers. Types of property which was redistributed was for instance land, 
livestock, animals, and personal items like wristwatches, jewelry and cooking pots (Dreyer 
2004). By 1975, official Chinese figures estimate that the communes existed in as much as 
93% of the Tibetan townships. However, the communes in Tibetan areas differed greatly from 
the ones introduced in China in 1950, amongst other things because the Tibetans where 
nomadic tent-dwellers scattered over huge geographical areas, thus each commune became 
smaller. Shortly after the communes had been introduced in large parts of Tibet, crop 
diversification was enforced. Chinese scientist visited the Tibetan plateau to see which crops 
and animals would survive the high altitude. Thus, hog rising was enforced in Tibetan 
communes in contrast to sheep and yak which had been the Tibetan traditional animal raising 
for decades. Winter wheat was replaced by the traditional Tibetan barley wheat. And a variety 
of fruits and vegetables, such as tomatoes, peppers, apples, peach and pears where introduces, 
though in small-scale production. In this period livestock and wheat production massively 
increased, which by 1979 had led to an ecological and economic disaster, leading to wide-
spread hunger in the Tibetan Plateau, to the extent to which Han-Chinese officials considered 
nonessential were evacuated from the region by helicopters to mainland China (Dreyer 
2004:132). Finally, the commune system in Tibet as in the rest of the PRC was rendered a 
failure, and was abandoned. With a leader shift in the Communist Party, a major conference 
held in Lhasa addressing the urgent crisis in Tibet, resulting from the previous failed policies, 
Ying promised a total eradication of poverty in Tibet by two-three years and a massive effort 
of improving the development. The state began to subsidize agriculture and animal 
husbandry. By 1984, despite the reforms, the economic indicators in Tibet had dropped. Thus, 
the practice of agricultural, pastoral, and industrial tax exemption was extended, animals were 
returned to private husbandry and wheat production was returned to barley, and there were no 
more experiments with Hogs. Tourism was encouraged, and people were granted larger 
freedoms as to how and what they wanted to cultivate.   
In 1986, the Chinese military in the region had to grow their own vegetables, and 
heavy state subsidies were poured into Tibet, exceeding the total agricultural and industrial 
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output in the region. For years there was a negative multiplier effect on investment in Tibet, 
which amongst other things was due to the fact that large parts of the subsidies were spent on 
covering the costs of the excessive administrative superstructure, as well as massive subsidies 
to Han-workers willing to come to work in Tibet. “A vicious cycle had developed in which 
Tibet was becoming more, not less, dependent on central government outlays, rather than 
using them to develop internal productive forces” (Dreyer 2004:135). The promotion of 
tourism, in combination with the tax-exemptions operations in TAR, lead to a large influx of 
Han-Chinese immigrants wanting to set up businesses in TAR, finally outnumbering Tibetans 
in Lhasa and other large, urban cities, and enraging the local Tibetan population.   
In 1987, for the first time since the historic uprising in 1959, Tibetans in Lhasa burst 
out in wide-spread, large-scale popular rebellion against the Chinese rule (Goldstein, Child 
and Wangdui 2010). In 1989 the uprisings intensified, leading to a declaration of martial law. 
This severely reduced tourism in the region. However, it was out of the question for the 
Chinese Communist Party to give in for the demands of the Tibetan protesters. Chocked by 
the overt political discontent and anger against the Chinese rule among Tibetans, and fearing 
further rebellion in the region, the Chinese Communist Party was thus forced to rethink their 
current political strategy in Tibet (Goldstein, Child and Wangdui 2010). 
The eastern coastal regions of the country, mainly inhabited by the Chinese ethnic 
majority groups Han and Hui, had for decades been favored in terms of economic 
investments, development projects and governmental subsidizes. Thus, at times of the 
uprisings in Lhasa of 1987, the western regions, including TAR and the other Tibetan 
inhabited areas, had for long suffered from extreme poverty, economic and social 
marginalization. Most of the Chinese eastern provinces, on the other hand, where benefitting 
from growth, opportunities and relative prosperity. As an attempt to defuse the “(…)political 
tensions among the ethnic minority inhabitants of the nation’s western regions”, the next 
Five-Year Plans of the CCP therefore aimed at smoothening up the economic inequalities in 
China through large-scale investments in development projects, first and foremost on China’s 
western provinces (Goldstein, Child and Wangdui 2010:58).  
However, the trickle-down-effect was largely taken for granted, assuming that where 
the overall Chinese development would improve, rural Tibetans in TAR and Tibetan inhabited 
areas in Kham and Amdo would gradually benefit. However, few direct steps were taken with 
that regards. In the 9
th
 Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and the 10
th
 Five-year Plan (2001-2005), 
the central government therefore initiated wide spread political efforts to get the west on track 
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economically by what came to be known as the Open Up the West Campaign, officially 
launched with the 10
th
 Five-Year Plan. However, both Plans had a great emphasis on 
infrastructure construction and GDP growth. For instance, in the latter Plan, the CCP invested 
as much as 31,2 billion yuan in 117 development projects aiming to enhance development and 
infrastructure in the TAR.  
The 11
th
 Five-Year Plan (2005-2011) launched the People’s First approach, aiming at 
improving the living conditions of rural Tibetans on more individual levels. The Plan 
promised an economic development spending on Tibet exceeding 100 billion yuan, more than 
the double of what was spent in the previous Plan. This included 180 development projects of 
which 33 were listed as People’s First projects aiming directly at enhancing the living 
conditions of poor Tibetan farmers and herders. 21, 9 billion yuan was ear marked for these 
projects, which, according to Fischer (2012) equals 10 200 yuan per rural Tibetan and 55 000 
yuan per rural household. In the center of the new approach was the Comfortable Housing 
Program (CHP), discussed and presented in detail later in this thesis.  
The 12
th
 Five-Year Plan launched in 2011 promised large efforts to strengthen the 
economies and furthering development of the underdeveloped Western Regions, Tibet and 
Tibetan inhabited areas included (Gu 2012). The CCPs plan, covering Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Guizhu and 
Yunnan, has a major emphasis on strengthening the economic growth in the region, 
infrastructure construction including highways and railroads, improving the public services, 
develop and strengthen the local industries, improve people’s living standards, reforming and 
liberalize the region and improve the ecological environment.  
Chinese officials continue to praise the CCP for its achievements in the region 
regarding modernization processes, human development and economic growth, frequently 
underpinned by official development statistics, numbers and figures. For instance, as quoted 
in People’s Daily, a party-run online newspaper in English, the former China Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, expressed already in 2008 that the development in the 
Tibetan Autonomous Regions was “better than ever”, and went as far as to say that the 
government was “mobilizing the whole nation to help the development of Tibet” (People’s 
Daily 2008, 2).  
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4. Analysis of Empirical Findings and Discussion:  
Entanglements of Power, Indigenous Skepticism, and Limited Popular 
Support of the Chinese Development Policies in Tibet 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the findings from my qualitative interviews with recent 
Tibetan arrivals in Dharamsala. To repeat, aim is to answer the following research questions: 
1) to which extent, and in which ways, could the practical undertaking of Chinese 
development policies in Tibet be seen as entailing exercises of different kinds of ‘power’, and 
2) to which extent have the Chinese development processes in Tibet succeeded in gaining 
popular support amongst local Tibetans?   
 Due to the practical purpose of clarity, I have chosen to divide my findings in to 
different sub-topics that evolved through my interviews. These are 1) the Comfortable 
Housing Program, 2) access to education and its connections to assimilation, 3) road 
infrastructure construction, and 4) political repression.  
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4.1 The Comfortable Housing Program (CHP) 
One of the most common topics that naturally evolved during my interviews with the Tibetan 
arrivals was the CCP’s project of providing safe, modern housing to Tibetans in Tibet as an 
expressed measure to increase people’s living standards through the program known as the 
‘Comfortable Housing Program’ (CHP).   
The CHP was launched by the CCP in 2006 in the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan, with an initial 
goal of providing safe, modern houses for 1,2 million farmers and herdsmen in Tibet 
(People’s Daily 2008, 1). This equals about 230 000 Tibetan families, or roughly 80% of 
TARs total demographic area of poor housing facilities (People’s Daily 2008, 1). However, as 
this goal was achieved one year ahead of schedule, the project was later expanded upon and 
furthered in the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan (Xinhuanet 2010). Generally, the current plan has a 
strong focus on what is termed “a scientific outlook on development” (CCP 2011, chapter 2). 
This includes amongst other things a strong emphasizing on modernization processes, efforts 
aimed at balancing the urban and the rural development, economic growth and improvements 
of the industrial sector (CCP 2011, chapter 2). The plan states that “[t]he inevitable way to 
promote scientific development is to maintain the cardinal line of speeding up the 
transformation of economic development (…)” (CCP 2011, chapter 2).  
Except from two young women (“Tsundue”, Interview 17, and “Norbu”, Interview 18) 
from extremely rural and isolated villages in Kham and Amdo, all of my interviewees were 
well aware of the practice of house construction as a form of development project. This was 
the case to the extent that the majority either had direct experiences with such projects 
themselves, or was familiar with the program through relatives, neighbors or friends who 
themselves had such direct experiences.  
4.1.2 Case 1) The CHP as a Political Strategy of Gaining Outside Recognition  
In many interviews the CHP came up when discussing the Chinese development processes in 
Tibet at large. Interestingly, the vast majority of the informants stated that they viewed the 
Chinese development efforts in Tibet as a political strategy for the CCP to improve its 
reputation to the outside world; to tourists and other visitors: rather than to benefit Tibetans. 
In various interviews, my informants exemplified and explained this perception by telling 
stories of their practical experiences with how the housing policies were implemented. The 
term “show off”, or equivalent expressions, were frequent characteristics utilized when 
expressing their feelings about the program, and about the development policies launched by 
the CCP at large. Therefore, I will start out this chapter with discussing the various 
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dimensions and aspects of the perception of the CHP as a strategy of gaining outside 
recognition for the CCP. 
The first informant I will introduce here is “Tenzin”. He is an uneducated, nomadic 
man of 23 years old, from a small village in eastern Tibet, Kham, who had only spent a few 
days in India when we did the interview. The first quote is his answer when I asked him how 
he felt about China having made Tibet more modern and developed, for instance through the 
construction of modern housing. I argue that his answers could be seen as a clear and eloquent 
illustration of what appears to be a common attitude towards the project among my overall 
group of informants:  
“In my view, the Chinese have made such policies that on the outside of the road, 
people are required to build the house in a way that makes them look very posh and 
very nice. Even if you cannot afford to build the whole house: the part that is visible to 
the road must be very beautiful and posh. And on the backside, which is not equally 
visible from the outside, it does not matter if it is made so that it is functional at all. In 
my experience, the Chinese used to pay some money to the rich Tibetans who could 
afford building very nice and beautiful houses, so that they would be willing to build 
their houses at the corner of the big roads. That is because the corner houses are more 
visible from the roads outside with the cars and the traffic. On the other hand, the 
people who are very poor, for instance in the rural areas, the government do very little 
to help them”. (“Tenzin”, Interview 5).  
 
A similar point was explicitly made by “Tsewang”, a 35 year old woman who originally 
comes from Kandze, Eastern Tibet, but who lived the last 16 years in Lhasa, TAR: 
 
 “In Lhasa, on the outside, the Chinese are trying to make everything look nice and 
good, you know. But the thing is… below the surface the situation is very bad, and the 
Chinese are not doing good things. […]They renew old and ugly houses on the 
outside, making them appear… modern… but inside of the houses, nothing is done! 
They care very much about letting the streets looking clean for the outside public. As a 
matter of fact, beggars where thrown out of the city center in Lhasa when the 
government opened up for tourists! I guess they didn’t wanna make people think the 
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beggars existed. Yes, on the outside they want things to look normal and nice. But the 
real situation is actually rather different.” (“Tsewang”, Interview Nr.1). 
It is not clear from the quotes above in which ways they believe it would be in the interests of 
the CCP to present a more beautiful material façade in Tibet when “the real situation is 
actually rather different” (“Tsewang”, Interview Nr. 1). Neither do we know anything about 
the scope and frequency behind such practices of implementation. However, a report launched 
by the Human Rights Watch in 2006, which is dealing particularly with the resettling 
strategies imposed by the CCP aimed at moving Tibetan nomads into modern housing as a 
part of the CHP: to some extent confirms the existence of what appears to be a tendency 
among the CCP to put a great emphasis on outer recognition for their work:  
 
“(T)he actual beneficiaries have not been poor families but the moderately well-off, whose 
moves into such housing have been extensively filmed and shown on television, apparently to 
give an impression of government largesse and new regional prosperity. In several reported 
cases, land vacated by relocated villagers is now being used for mining or other infrastructure 
projects” (HRW 2006, Web). 
 
What seems to be more clear is that to build houses with limited functionality, or to aid 
already rich middle-class families in their pursuit of a new house, regardless of its scope and 
frequency appear paradoxical, assuming that the actual motivation for implementation of the 
policy is to improve the well-being of Tibetan households defined as poor and in need. If 
improving the well-being of such households would be the aim, we can assume that the actual 
functionality of these houses would be given priority instead of their visual appearance. 
Furthermore, if aiding poor Tibetan families to get safer shelters to live in, it does not seem 
like the logic choice of recipient group would be the rich Tibetans, living near high roads, and 
with enough cash to build a beautiful house to begin with.  
One could of course also argue that it might be nothing but a peculiar coincidence that 
two of my twenty informants, independently of each other, and from different geographical 
regions in Tibet, pointed at a similar practice of building good-looking houses which are 
dysfunctional on the inside. However, another informant, “Lobsang”, a nomadic man with 
personal experiences of the CHP from a rural village in Kham, stated: 
 
“They [the Chinese officials] promised that the houses would be very good and that 
there would be electricity all year around. However, when the houses were done, they 
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[the Chinese] only put on the electricity when a Chinese official would come for a 
visit, and the houses were not at all good. There’s a lack of electricity, you see. […] 
The Chinese are reporting out to the World about their huge developments in Tibet, 
but that’s words, words, words, too many words!”(“Lobsang” Interview Nr.14 ) 
However, if we put these empirical findings in connection to previous literature: I argue that 
the experiences of “Tenzin”, “Tsewang” and “Lobsang” above might lead us to new 
dimensions of insights into the research topic of this thesis.  
In their article, Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui (2010) present what appears to be a 
convincing scholarly piece of academic research, which at the same time indicates the great 
success of the CHP project in Tibet in particular, and the People-First development strategy in 
general. Although their study did not deal with nomadic Tibetan communities, but with 
farmers, I argue that useful insights could be drawn from an analysis which includes their 
work. Through a prolonged fieldwork over an extended period of time, they investigate into 
the implementation of the CHP and another People-First development project in three 
different Tibetan villages. In their methodological section, they state that: 
 
“There were no restrictions on our access to the villagers. We were free to meet with them 
without needing permission, and the villagers could also come freely to visit us. In addition to 
interviews, the project conducted demographic and socio–economic surveys of all households 
in the three villages” (Goldstein, Childs, Wangdui 2010: 62). 
 
In the concluding remarks of their work, they state that their “(…) findings indicate that that 
the rhetoric of senior Chinese and Tibetan officials regarding the social development of rural 
Tibet has been actively pursued” (Goldstein, Childs, Wangdui 2010:72). According to their 
research, limited problematic aspects were seen as involved in the implementation process of 
the program in the villages subjected to their study. Rather, the project appeared to have had a 
remarkable beneficial effect on the Tibetan community, who according to the researchers, was 
eager to take use of the new financial opportunities of direct subsidies earmarked for house 
construction that the new program implied.  
The only exception seems to be that they point out the existence of a local resentment 
to the Chinese requirements of building their new houses near the high roads. According to 
their research the Tibetans saw this requirement as practically inconvenient and 
incomprehensible. Out from a post-development perspective as discussed in Chapter 2, one 
could of course criticize such a practice amongst other things for apparently not taking local 
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interests sufficiently into account, by not giving the recipients a choice as to whether or not to 
leave their land and move into houses near the high roads. Since we here are taking about a 
nomadic people, with strong connection to the land and to the nature, I argue that it appears 
highly understandable that the recipients demonstrated various degrees of skepticism is 
moving further away from a rural periphery to a high way. However, as the article by 
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui did not aim at applying a particular post-development 
approach to their empirical study, unlike my research project, one could argue that their work 
could hardly be criticized for not sufficiently problematizing that aspect.  
However, what arguably could be criticized, regardless of chosen theoretical 
perspective applied, is that the researchers uncritically assumes that the requirements of 
building the houses near the high ways were imposed by the CCP in order “[…]to improve 
communication and facilitate the implementation of social programs”. (Goldstein, Childs and 
Wangdui 2010:66). In that way, the requirement is, despite its local resentment, assumed to be 
driven by a well-intended aim of facilitating social programs from the side of the CCP. This 
suggestion could of course hold some empirical validity. However, in light of the perception 
revealed through my interviews with informants like “Tashi”, “Lobsang” and “Tsewang” 
quoted above, the underlying reasons for imposing this requirement upon the Tibetan 
recipient could, might as well, be seen as a strategy to increase the visibility of the work by 
the CCP to outsiders. That possibility is ignored in their research.  
As this discussion will highlight, there also appears to exist many good political 
reasons for China to present an outside image of growth and prosperity in Tibet, regardless of 
its actual effects and functionality on the ground. I argue therefore that Goldstein, Childs and 
Wangdui fail to critically discuss aspects which appear to be of high relevance for their 
analysis, arguably indicating a deficit in their otherwise well-researched empirical and 
theoretical work. I will explain.  
Interestingly, they do for instance at the same time argue that the CHP and the People-
First development approach could be seen as an “(…) economic strategy (which) also allows 
China to respond to international criticism by showing that living conditions in Tibet are good 
and improving” (Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui (2010:57). Out from this line of 
argumentation it appears clear that the researchers here assumes, without any form of 
problematization, that the PRC’s ‘economic strategy’ as they call it, is undertaken in a way 
which actually is in the intended interest of local Tibetans. I am of course not indicating here 
that the optimistic finding of the CHP of their research necessarily must be invalid or based 
on an ideological bias in favor of the CCP general insolvents in Tibet, economically speaking 
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or in general terms. However, what I find interesting here is that the authors, which by the 
Chinese authorities were granted a completely undisturbed and unlimited access to gather 
information at all levels of the organizational structure of three Tibetan villagers, on a 
politically charged issue like the internationally criticized development policies – ends up 
with a research result with strongly contradicts the findings of reports launched for instance 
by international human rights organizations. I argue that from a critical point of departure, is 
therefore becomes of relevance to take into consideration what a particularly optimistic study 
on the CHP in Tibet could entail for the reputation of the PRC, and analyze that in relations to 
their apparently completely limitation-less access to the research site. The Human Rights 
Watch argues:  
 
“Chinese security forces maintain a heavy presence and the authorities continue to tightly 
restrict access and travel to Tibetan areas, particularly for journalists and foreign visitors. 
Tibetans suspected of being critical of political, religious, cultural, or economic state policies 
are targeted on charges of “separatism.” (HRW 2012, Web). 
 
If Tibetans risk to be charged with accusations of “separatism” for doing something as 
apparently harmless as criticizing “economic state policies” as the above quote by the HRW 
indicates, why was this practical possibility not critically addressed, or even mentioned, in 
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui’s article? In the lights of the human rights criticism of what 
appears to be extreme limitations in the freedom of speech and expression, what is the 
guarantee that their informants have not been influences in their answers by a fear of political 
repression? However, one could perhaps counter this critique for instance by saying that if we 
as researchers must be that careful when taking use of the empirical findings driven from our 
qualitative fieldworks from within Tibet itself, one could argue that such empirical research in 
general would be of limited scientific value. And what kind of pragmatic utility would such a 
dismissal of all empiric research based on grassroots level fieldwork entail? I argue that doing 
qualitative fieldworks inside of Tibet – a disputed territory to begin with, and subjected to 
widespread international criticism – on topics that additionally could be perceived as 
politically charged themselves: necessarily would be methodologically challenging and 
problematic if a sufficiently critical attitude is not applied. This is not to say that I think we 
should reject all empiric or theoretical validity of their work altogether. Their direct 
observation of house providing, for instance, is a clear methodological strength of their work. 
That does not, however, diminish or erase the potential validity of my above criticism.   
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 At the same time Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui admits, as the quote above suggest, 
that an ‘economic strategy’ that benefits Tibetans could be used as a strategy by the PRC to 
‘respond to’ international “criticism”. What kind of ‘criticism’ they here are referring to 
remains unclear. They also admits that if it was so that the PRC’s ‘economic strategy’ and the 
CHP did not really benefit Tibetans, but rather, had a worsening effect on the living 
conditions for local people as they show the HRW (2006) amongst other things argues, the 
 
“CHP is likely to be intensifying anti-government sentiment. The consequences of China’s 
11th Five-Year Plan on rural Tibet are important, therefore, not just for an understanding of 
how economic change and modernization are proceeding in rural Tibet, but also for the 
broader Sino–Tibetan political issue” (Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2010:61)  
 
In that way, they do not seem to be unfamiliar with the thought that the Chinese development 
processes in Tibet and the CHP could be seen as a politicized issue to begin with and thus also 
relevant for the Sino-Tibetan conflict over territory in a more general way. It should also be 
mentioned that Goldstein and Childs both speaks fluent Tibetan, and has spent substantial 
amounts of time in Tibetan areas. Furthermore, as Powers (2004) suggested in the 
introductory section of chapter three, there appears to be little ambiguity as to whether or not 
the Sino-Tibetan conflict should be seen as a highly sensitive, controversial and disputed 
political issue. Despite this awareness, the researchers fail to critically consider the possibility 
that there might not have been a coincidence that no restrictions by the Chinese authorities 
was imposed on them while doing research in a particular research site, which happened to 
end up with a highly optimistic analysis of the PRC’s development efforts in Tibet, to an 
extent that it almost could have been utilized as a commercial of success for their policies.  
While putting Michel Foucault’s ideas on discursive power in relation to the post-
development logic, this thesis clearly demonstrated how the western idea of modernization, 
industrialization, economic growth – the traditional, mainstream view of ‘development’ – 
could be seen as a ‘developmental discourse of truth’. The ‘unquestioned desirability’ of 
‘development’ would according to this view be seen as taken for granted. As a result, 
independent criticism of projects and processes of political change that would go under the 
branch of ‘development’ becomes severely restricted, as the discursive power operates in a 
way of blurring our view as it affects our mere way of thinking and seeing the world, its 
functions and its peoples. Furthermore, as the discussion in Chapter 2 suggest, ‘development’ 
could be seen as a highly political and normative matter, which I argue, appears to be perhaps 
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even clearer in the context of Tibet – a disputed territory full of valuable natural resources, 
and imbedded with minority-related rights-issues, and radically differing historical 
interpretations (Powers 2004).  
Furthermore, while Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui (2010) as mentioned does not 
indicate precisely which kind of ‘criticism’ they refer to, Fischer (2001) takes on a far bolder 
position, arguing that the CCP “expects the international community to tolerate human rights 
abuses as an expedient element of their beneficial economic strategies” (Fischer 2002:6). In 
the light of Fischer’s boldness, the apparently value-neutral choice of the word ‘allows’ 
combined with their vague and inexplicit use of the general word ‘criticism’, makes the 
statement by Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui above to appear more like a convenient 
euphemism.   
I do of course not suggest here that I think it appears likely that Goldstein, Childs and 
Wangdui coincidently are trying to manipulate the reader to obtain a more optimistic image of 
the PRC’s work than what is actually the case. Such a suggestion would be absurd and 
ungrounded considering the well-referenced, nuanced and otherwise methodologically 
thorough quality that characterizes their work. And furthermore, what would be in their 
interest to portray the CCP in a better light than what the empirical reality would suggest? 
What I do argue, is that their research appears to apply an approach which does not appear to 
be sufficiently conflict-sensitive and self-critical. Furthermore, by not taking into account the 
human rights situation in Tibet, with leading international human rights organizations 
standing firm in their suggestion year after year that freedom of speech in Tibet is extremely 
restricted and that Tibetans thus face the possibility of being charged with “separatism” if 
revealing themselves as generally critical even to matters related to economic policies: they 
demonstrate what appears to be a limited interest in the potential effects of human rights 
violations on development processes on the ground. This is interesting, considering that the 
UN as early as in 2003 attempted to mainstream the Human Rights Based Approach to 
development practices (UN 2003). Out from my general research of previous literature on 
development processes in Tibet, my overall impression is that this appears to be a general 
tendency in much scholarship on development in Tibet under the PRC. The human rights 
situation in the region is simply not taken into account to any substantial extent as an aspect of 
the overall analyses, thus presuming that ‘development’ adequately could be seen in an almost 
complete isolation to the general human rights violations in the region. My findings in this 
research indicate that this becomes an insufficient and inadequate port of departure.  
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Unlike Fischer (2002) who sees the development efforts in Tibet as a mean to justify 
human rights abuses, possibly explaining the apparent paradox in implementing what appears 
to be a highly ineffective development practice, Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui furthermore 
argue that the CCP’s emphasis of enhancing the material conditions in Tibet could be seen as 
a means to decrease the Tibetan political discontent towards the PRC’s unwillingness to grant 
a greater autonomy to Tibet (2010). But whereas Fischer sees the practice as an attempt to 
seduce the outside world so that they to a larger extent could see through the fingers of Chinas 
human rights violations, Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui thereby sees the practice as an 
attempt to seduce the Tibetans to refrain from potential political dissent. They see: 
 
“[…]modernization and economic development in Tibet as a means of linking Tibet 
inextricably with the rest of China, while also inculcating loyalty by showing Tibetans that 
being part of the PRC is in their short- and long-term material interests. (2010:57) 
 
 American researcher Barry Sautman, with a base in Hong Kong, and which in some of his 
works consequently refer to the Tibetan exiles as a “Tibetan émigré”, argues that “(…)PRC 
officials contended that the exile cause will recede when the Dalai Lama passes on and 
development transforms Tibetan society (Sautman 2004 is Sautman and Dreyer 2004:4, 
Sautman in Sautman and Dreyer 2004:230).  
Interestingly, the PRC itself appears to pull a direct connection between improved 
material conditions and improvements in their human rights accords. The recent White Paper 
on human rights launched by the PRC deals for instance with “China's progress in protecting 
human rights through improving people's livelihood” and argues that “Development is the key 
to solving all existing problems and facilitating progress of human rights in China” (People’s 
Daily 2013). The PRC thus seams to assume a direct connection between improvements in 
what it sees as ‘development’ and what it sees as ‘human rights’. I argue that this logic might 
be discursively connected to the ongoing debate within the field of human rights on ‘the right 
to development’. My informant, “Tenzin”, on the other hand, appears to apply a 
fundamentally different understanding and definition of ‘human rights’ and what it would 
mean in practice:   
 
“It seems like to me that the Chinese give the aid to Tibetans because Tibetans and 
others then should praise them. But I think that human rights are very important. For 
instance, I think it is much better to have the freedom to participate in the monastic 
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institutions, for those who want that, and also the opportunities to take modern 
education and go to school being thought in the Tibetan language.” (“Tenzin”, 
Interview 5)  
Whereas the above discussion still does not necessarily fulfills the complete purpose of 
explaining the paradox of what appears to be a superficial and inefficient practice of 
implementing the CHP project in practice according to the experience of “Tenzin” and 
“Tsewang”, it nevertheless appears to confirm the validity of the position held by Bauer, 
Childs, Craig and Fischer (2010) suggesting that “(…) development in Tibetan areas is 
inherently political”, and that “(…) development in Tibetan areas is fraught with a host of 
unintended or unanticipated consequences (2010:7).  
The Human Rights Watch (2006, Web) strongly criticize the practice of how the CHP 
with regards to Tibetan nomads in particular. That is because the program according to their 
research sometimes is implemented by Chinese officials who tend to use force, rendering the 
Tibetan nomadic recipients no choice but to accept to move into the new housing facilities in 
the first place, even if it goes against their will. According to the HRW, the houses are 
furthermore often smaller than the original houses, and based on strict regulations, which 
amongst other things disable the recipients to build courtyards. This, in turn, forces herders 
and farmers to sell off their animal stocks. Such an implementation practice, the report argues, 
thereby render many Tibetan nomadic recipients in a worse economic condition than before, 
as an important part of their livelihood thus is taken away from them. Although the practical 
implementation of the CHP might have changed to some extent since the HRW report was 
written (2006), in the light of the findings of my empirical interviews, I still believe its 
insights appear to be of empiric validity. It should furthermore be pointed out that the 
situation as a nomad makes the potential issues of the CHP different than for what would be 
the case for ordinary Tibetan farmers. That is amongst other things because the farmers are 
settled in fixed houses to begin with, whereas the nomads are not. Thus, potential issues of 
assimilation, tradition and cultural identity would not necessarily be valid to the same extent 
in the case of the Tibetan farmers. Regardless of this crucial distinction, this is a part of a 
narrative of “Lobsang” and his experiences with the CHP:  
 
“I am myself a nomad, my family too is nomadic. […] However, in my district we were 
offered money from the government if we accepted to move from our land where the 
animals had been gazing, and into new houses they would give us near the highway. 
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They said we should move because of environmental reasons. They said it was not 
good for the nature that the animals were gazing at the fields because of the carbon 
emissions, or something like that. […] Then, we were given construction work, we 
would build the houses ourselves, and we were promised salary from the Chinese for 
the work. Many nomads sold their animals when they had to move to the highway 
because of the houses the Chinese wanted us to build. Our family too, we sold most of 
them. However, when we had finished constructing the houses, we were left without 
animals, and without construction work. All for the worse! So we could no longer 
work as nomads. The only thing we could do in those houses was to eat and to sleep! 
What’s the use of that? I feel I had no future there anymore. That bragging about the 
housings is something they do for propaganda to the outside world. I got desperate! I 
had no work! We lost our job because of those houses near the highway.” (“Lobsang”, 
Interview 14).  
 
The experience of “Lobsang” and his family as posed in the quote above, could be put in 
connection to what appears to be a broader strategy by the CCP. Human Rights Watch (2013, 
Web) argues that: 
“(…)the government continues to implement large development programs mandating 
rehousing or relocating up to 80 percent of the rural population. The relocation policies have 
been carried out—contrary to Chinese government claims—with no effective choice and 
without genuine consultation of those affected, while compensation mechanisms are opaque 
and inadequate. Pastoralists deprived of their traditional livelihood face declining living 
standards and increased dependency on government subsidies. (HRW 2013, Web) 
My informant “Dondup”, a 19 year old man from a village in western Tibet, TAR, went even 
further in his criticism:  
“They [the Chinese officials] are fooling the people [the Tibetans]! Sometimes they 
are building houses, and then, the Tibetans have to pay rent and pay for water. Yes, 
they force people to sell their animals, and then they send them to the butcher! We [the 
Tibetans] always try to do minimum harm to the animals when we have to kill them, 
but they [the Chinese] are so brutal to them. Sometimes they suffocate them
5
. As 
compensation for having been forced to sell their animals to the Chinese, they are 
                                                          
5
 The practice of suffocating the animals is also a practice applied by Tibetan herders in certain areas of Tibet.  
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given some construction work to do for a living. Yes, they [the Tibetans] get to build 
houses, and after they are finished building them, they have to pay rent and for water 
to the Chinese. They are fooling us with their buildings! When the houses are built, 
they have no more animals and no more construction work!” (“Dondup”, Interview 
10). 
Out from a post-development port of departure, one could clearly criticize this practice for not 
taking into account indigenous Tibetan knowledge systems, assuming that modern concrete 
houses would be valued higher than a livestock of animals. But it could also be criticized for 
forcing Tibetans to abandoning their culture as traditional herders and nomads by moving into 
houses, for the recipients who until then had been living in traditional tents.  
If improved material conditions in Tibet are understood to enhance the international 
reputation of the CCP, I argue that there might be a grate likelihood that my informant’s 
experiences and observations actually might represent a broader and more substantial empiric 
validity than what perhaps immediately would have been assumed. In other words, 
researchers from the right to the left, from the PRC to Andrew Fischer, appear to agree that it 
would be in the CCP’s interest to either 1) present an image, real or constructed, of improving 
the material living conditions of rural Tibetans as a means to smoothen out the human rights 
criticism or other criticisms they face in the international community, or 2) by improving the 
economic and material conditions in Tibet contribute in solving the political dispute in the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict over territory, by integrating the Tibetans more into the China and 
making them feel that it is in their material benefit being a part of the PRC.  
If we are to believe the suggestions posed above, it might appear more understandable 
why the CCP eventually could have gone so far as to bribing rich Tibetan families to build 
their houses on the corner roads, in their pursuit of a beautiful economic outside image. 
4.1.3. Advancing Discursive Power through the CHP? 
Drawing on the recent work by Martha Nussbaum (2011), we have previously in this thesis 
seen how the term ‘development’ and its definitions in many cases appear to be imbedded 
with normative valuations, and at times, even ideological preferences. Thus, the ways in 
which we choose to define ‘development’ could be understood as political endeavors, and is 
likely to entail pragmatic implications for individual human beings on the ground. In that 
way, our understanding of this complex term is of ethical importance.  
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By drawing on the theories on ‘discursive power’ developed by Michel Foucault as 
discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis has argued how what has been called a ‘development 
consensus’, could be seen as an uncritical and unquestioned embracement of the traditional 
westernized development concept grounded on modernization, industrialization and economic 
growth. The ‘developmental discourse of truth’, could therefore entail what he sees as 
‘discursive power’. Precisely because such a developmental ‘discourse of truth’ presents 
‘development’ as inhibiting a taken-for-granted desirability, it exercises discursive power in 
the sense that it is likely to shape and frame the ‘will’ of individuals in a way which disable 
them to see beyond the consensus of ‘development’ as something normatively good. This is 
interesting, because, as the above discussion argues, it is clear that the concept of 
‘development’ could entail and signify many highly different things depending on the ones 
that frames, defines and applies its contents.  
 Now, it appears rather clear that the empirical findings discussed in this section 
indicates that the Chinese development policies in Tibet have not succeeded in gaining high 
levels of popular support among local Tibetans. However, based on the theoretical insights 
summarized above, what could such a case teach on the extent to which ‘power’ in general 
and ‘discursive power’ in particular can be seen as present in the practical undertaking of the 
Chinese development policies in Tibet?  
 I argue that by constructing houses to poor Tibetans which looks “posh” to outsiders, 
but simultaneously without an appropriate functionality: the CCP might be seen as improving 
its chances of benefitting from a ‘developmental discourse of truth’ which uncritically 
assumes that almost any project that could go under the branch of ‘development’ necessarily 
would entail something desirable and beneficial to its recipients. As independent travelers, 
researchers, tourists or visitors to Tibet, we, as outsiders, might be struck by what on the 
outside looks like a highly successfully implemented development project, seemingly 
undertaken by a generous and benign CCP. What we see on the outside is that they have 
granted what we assume must be highly wanted and needed modern housing to poor 
individuals of the otherwise marginalized Tibetan ethnicity.   
The requirement of making Tibetan recipients building their houses near the high ways 
could indeed be grounded in a genuine desire from the CCP’s side to facilitate the 
‘implementation of social programs’, as Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui argues. However, it 
could also be grounded in a non-existing desire from the CCP’s side of facilitating the 
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implementation of such social programs, or improving the living standards of needy Tibetan 
individuals and households for that sake. But rather, to use it as a political strategy to increase 
its poor international reputation in its treatment of minority peoples in general, and the 
Tibetans in particular. The ‘developmental discourse of truth’, with its ‘unquestioned 
desirability’ might aid outsiders like Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui in a taken-for-granted 
optimistic analysis of the CHP and its effect on the ground, ignoring underlying power 
structures and the importance of indigenous discontent.  
If the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan, with the CHP project in its core, fails to succeed in its 
attempt of winning high degrees of Tibetan popular support, the result might be that the anti-
government sentiment among Tibetans might increase (Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2010). 
The result could be that the anti-government riots among Tibetans will expand in frequency 
and scope (Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2010). This result appears to be in direct 
contradiction of the CCP’s expressed aim of using ‘development’ as a tool to reduce the 
support of the Tibetan exile cause for greater autonomy and larger freedoms, which in turn is 
intrinsically connected to the anti-government sentiment.  
According to the findings in this research, one reason behind what appears to be a very 
limited popular support among my Tibetan informants towards the Chinese development 
policies in general, and towards the CHP in particular, is that it is seen by many as a 
superficial ‘show-off’ in the benefit of the CCP. It is seen as a convenient tool utilized to gain 
increased international recognition and praise, and not first and foremost to benefit Tibetan 
recipients on the ground. I argue thus that the CCP appears to be biting its own tale by 
neglecting the importance of local support in favor of the potential beneficial aspects of 
obtaining a beautiful façade. This facade seems furthermore to be reinforcing and benefitting 
from the ‘unquestioned desirability of development’ and its successive ‘discourse of truth’.  
4.1.4 Case 2) The CHP and Conditional Development: “It Works Like… Bribery” 
In the next section on my findings regarding the housing policies, I will present an interesting 
account regarding the way in which my informant “Sonam” suggested that the houses and 
financial grants were distributed by the CCP officials. I will later show how this practice can 
be seen as related to the first and third dimension of ‘power’, and how it relates to human 
rights. On my question regarding what he thought of the CHP and the Chinese efforts of 
improving the lives of Tibetans through increased development, my informant “Sonam”, a 
political refugee in his late twenties from Chamdo, Eastern Tibet, TAR, suggested:  
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“Well, how should I put it? It works like… bribery. If you accept their claims [the 
Chinese officials] that the Dalai Lama is bad, they’ll give you a house. If not, they will 
give you no house. If you accept to support the Chinese Communist Party, they’ll give 
you a house. If not, you will get no house. You see the picture? It’s like… aid on 
conditions”. (“Sonam”, Interview Nr.11) 
When I then suggested that the Chinese government also seems to have improved the living 
standard of Tibetans in certain ways, for instance through their programs of financial aid to 
poor families, the tone in “Sonam’s” answer became even sharper:  
“You know, that’s more like false propaganda in a way. They [the PRC] want to 
appear like they provide good facilities and are threating the people [the Tibetans] 
good, building huge, good roads, etcetera, you know, like a “show off”. Yes, they 
would make China look good to the public” (…). Well, if you sign agreements with the 
Chinese government, stating that you don’t really support the Dalai Lama, for 
instance, they might give you the aid! And of course, many people, they do sing! If you 
are poor and needy, if you really struggle to support your family, of course many 
Tibetans they sign! And then, the grants are provided. However, for those who refuse 
to accept the things the Chinese authorities want them to accept, they’ll receive 
nothing! Nothing!”(“Sonam”, Interview Nr.11). 
What “Sonam” here refers to as “bribery” and “false propaganda”, might perhaps at first 
glance be perceived as slightly politically tendentious due to the seemingly politicized 
language. At the same time, it is not difficult to understand that “Sonam” gets upset if he has 
to denounce his religious values and indirectly be forced to praise the CCP if he does not 
really feel that corresponds to his personal political considerations and values.  
When taking in to account the grave levels of poverty and the low levels of material 
standards in Tibet as revealed in Chapter 3, out from a westernized point of view one could 
perhaps argue that it does not seem fair to so mercilessly dismissing the value of these 
practices all together, simply as “false propaganda” and nothing more. Would not the human 
suffering of denouncing the Dalai Lama be less pressing and grave than the human suffering 
of not having a proper house to live in? However, when drawing on the ideas developed 
through the post-development school of thought, I would here suggest that such a perception 
seem to be grounded on a culturally westernized, urban and secular assumption which puts a 
very high value in material comforts and economic well-being, and not necessarily taking 
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local traditions, values and knowledge systems sufficiently seriously. Therefore, in order to 
fully understand the implications and underlying reasons behind “Sonam’s” experience, I 
argue that useful insights could be drawn if taking into account the findings on the first, 
second and third face of ‘power’, as well as post-development theory, as presented in Chapter 
2.  
  Being ‘bribed’ as “Sonam” posed it, into stating or writing something that he 
otherwise would not have stated, and which opposes his actual will, in this case, that he does 
not support the Dalai Lama, but rather supports the work of the Chinese Communist Party: 
might at first glance be understood as an exercise of the ‘intuitive’, first-dimensional form of 
‘power’, as developed by Robert Dahl. I will explain. 
If ‘power’ is understood to be present where ‘A’ makes ‘B’ do something that ‘B’ 
otherwise would not do, and which goes against the interests of ‘B’: it appears that A (the 
Chinese development officials) in this case exercised ‘power’ over B (“Sonam”, the Tibetan 
recipient), by making him state in a written document that he does not support the Dalai Lama 
and that he is happy about the work of the CCP, although in reality there are reasons to 
assume, judging from the anger and emotionality in “Sonam’s” interview, that he indeed does 
support the Dalai Lama and even might be directly unhappy with the work of the CCP. 
However, as the suggested empirical scenario presented here in reality was slightly more 
complex, I argue that the third dimensional view of power in this case actually becomes 
inapplicable.  This, I will argue, if taking the insights from the second and third face of power, 
can be seen as an indication of its empirical deficits.  
Although B, if drawing on “Sonam’s” suggestion in the above quotes, was poor and 
thus in desperate and acute need of both housing and financial grants: it would not be seen as 
an exercise of power as both parties in the conflict reached what appears to be an overt and 
voluntary agreement (a compromise), resulting in a contract signed by both parties.  
As A offers to grant B a house and/or financial grants on the condition that B would 
sign a contract, the signing of this contract would according to this view be seen as the 
practical possibility, or freedom, enjoyed by B to reject the offer presented by A. The conflict 
would thus be seen as resolved: B voluntarily complied with the will of A, and therefore he 
gave him his signature. As manipulation, coerce and the idea of ‘real interests’ are not 
included in the understanding of the first face of power, we could therefore conclude that 
power in our case have not been exercised. Furthermore, B could also be seen as to have 
65 
 
increased his interests (a house, development grants), whereas A also appears to increase what 
is in his benefit (a written recognition that the poor peasant Tibetan, B, denounce the Dalai 
Lama in favor of his ‘support’ to the CCP). Thus there has been no zero-sum game involved, 
which is one of the criteria for distinguishing the exercise of ‘power over’: the one-
dimensional power. 
As we have seen, power could also be seen as far more complex that what Dahl 
suggests. Thus, when analyzing that same situation more in depth, according to the second 
and third face of power, I argue that new and interesting insights can be drawn with regards to 
our case in question. By utilizing negative terms like “false propaganda” and “bribery”, I 
argue that it appears reasonable to assume that “Sonam” did not really see the act of B 
complying with A’s proposal of signing such a document as a completely voluntary act. That 
is amongst other things because he pointed out how poor and desperate B was, in relation to 
his compliance with the proposal made by A. “Sonam” thus indicates that it was B’s 
challenging financial condition which indirectly left him with no real choice but compliance, 
and not because it was in his real interest denouncing the Dalai Lama or praise the CCP.  
Either he would 1) sign a contract with demands which to B would be consider 
unreasonable and perhaps even hurting, but gaining a house/financial grants as a result, or 2) 
he would not sign the contract at all, and thus neither receive the support that he desperately 
needs, nor getting hurt by the demand of denouncing the Dalai Lama or praising the CCP 
against his real will. This, I argue, leads us particularly to Lukes third-dimensional view of 
power.  
As discussed in earlier chapters, this view of power includes among other things the 
shaping and the framing of people’s will, wishes and desires to the advantage of the part who 
holds, and exercises, power. Lukes third face of power would not, unlike the theory developed 
by Dahl, take for granted that B was, just because he signed a contract, acting according to his 
own interests or his ‘real will’. That is because he was never granted the opportunity to shape 
his own alternative to the two limited possibilities he was offered. A possibility of 3) being 
able to receive housing and/or financial support from the CCP if he wanted to, but without 
denouncing the Dalai Lama or promise a support to the CCP, was never a part of the deal. 
One could of course argue that since he nevertheless accepted one of the two possibilities he 
was offered by the Chinese official(s), it seems that it was more important to him to receive 
the financial aid by the government, than not to reject the Dalai Lama or praise the CCP.  
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However, by limiting his ‘choices’ to two rather poor alternatives, I argue that the 
Chinese official in our case is narrowing down the ‘will’ of B to choose from alternatives 
which are not in compliance with B’s ‘real interests’. That is not, of course, because it is 
unlikely that B would have had the intellectual ability or internal capacity to imagine other 
and better alternatives. If that was the case, it would perhaps be more appropriate to discuss 
this case as a matter of ‘discursive power’, using Michel Foucault’s term. However, it is 
because B experienced that there existed no other alternatives than two poor ones mentioned 
above, which in turn disables him to act in a way that would actually be in his real interest: 
option 3.  
We could therefore conclude that it appears that the third-dimension of power was 
exercised in this case. And that, I argue, to some extent might explain the anger and high 
degree of emotional involvement in “Sonam’s” rejection of these policies as “false 
propaganda” and “bribery” altogether. I argue therefore that his mercilessness in his 
evaluation of the Chinese housing and aid programs seems to be connected to how the need 
for financial aid and housing, according to his previous statements, appears to be utilized by 
the Chinese authorities in question, as a mean to make him either reject the Dalai Lama, or 
promise faithfulness to the CCP.  
 Michel Foucault wrote in 1978 that “where there is power, there is resistance” 
(Foucault 1978:95, part four). I argue therefore, that in the light of what my empirical 
research demonstrates is a limited degree of popular support towards the Chinese 
development policies among my Tibetan informants: could be seen as an empiric validation of 
Foucault’s theoretic idea of a connection between the exercise of ‘power’ and the exposure of 
‘resistance’.  
4.2 Infrastructure Projects and its Limited Value: the Effects of Checkpoints  
When the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered Tibet with its troops in the late 1940’s, it 
began a massive process of building road infrastructure. Dreyer argues that this was done in 
order “(…) to ease the integration of Tibetan areas with Han China”, and thus facilitating the 
influx necessary for trading such as caravans and construction materials, but also the influx of 
Chinese soldiers, army equipment and Chinese immigrants (Dreyer 2004: 130). Since then, 
road and railway infrastructure has played a crucial role in PRC’s development policies in the 
region, including in the current 12
th
 Five-Year Plan of the CCP (CCP 2011). The plan states 
that “(…) infrastructure development is the undisputed key to the success of the region” (Gu, 
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China-briefing 2012). Furthermore, the grate emphasis on infrastructure construction and the 
building of railroads could be linked to the CCP’s grater plan of facilitating urbanization of 
rural areas: a goal in the current Plan is that by the year 2015, 45% of the population within 
the PRC would be living in urban areas (CCP 2011).  
While the comfortable housing projects was something nearly all of my interviewees, 
without my interference, pointed out as ‘a development project’, this was not the case with the 
infrastructure construction projects. Many informants did not seem to see the connection 
between road and railway construction and ‘development’ at all. This could for instance be 
illustrated by my informant “Tsundue”, a woman in her late teens for a rural area in eastern 
Kham, stating: 
“High roads? Who cares! Railways? I don’t understand what you mean by this 
development... There has been no development in my village, that’s for sure. And I 
really don’t care about it either” (“Tsundue”, Interview Nr.17). 
However, the following quote by “Tenzin” might at first glance not seam directly relevant to 
the infrastructure projects and the CCP’s development policies. However, when later putting 
his narrative in a broader context of the overall restrictions of the freedom of movement in 
Tibet, I argue that useful insights could be drawn for his example. When I asked “Tenzin” 
about how in his experience the situation in Tibet affects the people’s abilities to live happy 
lives, his answer was as follows:  
 “Happy? Hmm. Well… it is rather difficult for Tibetans to go to places freely. If we 
want to go somewhere, we have to show our identity cards as well as the travel 
documents at the checkpoints, and then we run the risk of being rejected. Such 
restrictions exist because of the presence of the military and the police, so many 
Tibetans actually feel tense… yes, even unhappy. The authorities check individuals 
randomly, and if we do not have the required travel permits and documents, we cannot 
go anywhere. So people feel that life is very difficult because of the lack of freedoms 
for individuals. For instance, if I was in the Kham region, and I wanted to visit my 
own parents in Lhasa, I would need a permit from the Chinese officials, and they 
would have to accept providing me with the required documents. Without their 
consent, it would be impossible to go there, even if the purpose for my travel was to 
visit my own parents. There are different levels of travel permits depending on the 
geographical regions, you see. First, you have to obtain the first level permit. And then 
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you need all the other permits too in order to reach Lhasa. You don’t have to pay very 
much to get them, but it does cost you a little bit” (“Tenzin”, Interview Nr. 5).  
The rules for travel permits for Tibetans from Eastern Tibet to go to Lhasa, a holy city 
according to Tibetan Buddhist believers, where also pointed out by “Tsewang”, the woman 
who spent 16 years in Lhasa after growing up in Kandze, Eastern Tibet; 
“And did you know, the people form Kham and Amdo, if the wanna go to Lhasa, they 
have to get a special permit from the Chinese government, a paper that they are forced 
to sing, stating that they promise not to participate in demonstration, not talk about 
the Dalai Lama, and not about rights. And if they don’t sign? They cannot go.” 
(“Tsewang”, Interview 1) 
When I asked “Tenzin” about whether or not he had the impression that these restrictions 
where diminishing, he answered: 
“Well, there have always been checkpoints, but before, we didn’t use to need these 
travel permits at all. That’s actually something new. Yes, nowadays we even need a 
special permit even to go to the nearby areas. That was something that that started 
with last year. I think it is because many Tibetans are protesting in many different 
regions of Tibet. The self-immolations, you know. I think that’s why they imposed these 
additional travel restrictions” (“Tenzin”, Interview Nr. 5). 
As the introduction to this section indicates, it is clear that the Chinese Communist Party has 
built a large amount of road and railroad infrastructure in Tibet since the entrance of the PLA. 
However, when listening to personal narratives of single individual Tibetans and their 
experiences with travelling in Tibet, questions arises as to whether the Chinese investments in 
infrastructure projects in Tibet actually increases single individual’s possibilities for human 
development, agency and happiness. Out from the narratives above, it could seem like the 
CCP control and suppression of the freedom of movement in Tibet would render the new road 
infrastructure construction of limited utility to the Tibetan population.  
That is not, of course, to claim that lack of infrastructure should not be viewed as an 
adequate indicator of underdevelopment in the traditional meaning of the term. On the 
contrary, in line with Nussbaum’s understanding, I would argue that a general lack of 
infrastructure in a country limits human agency to some extent. That is because it disables 
people to choose freely where to go and when to go, thus restricting people’s freedoms and 
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choices. However, when a region is characterized by heavy control implying general travel 
restrictions, military checkpoints and requirement of travel permits to the extent that it even 
restricts individual’s abilities to visit their own parents in Lhasa, as “Tenzin’s” example 
indicated:  much of the increased human agency that otherwise would derive from good road 
and railroad infrastructure, simply disappear. Furthermore, highway and railroads in an 
otherwise rather remote area like rural Tibet, might also look like a spectacular evidence of 
‘progress’ to an uncritical outsider. When the Chinese government provides figures, statistics 
and numbers as to how much money they spend on infrastructure, these statistics does not say 
much about the effects of these projects in the practical reality for single individual Tibetans. 
Just as with the CHP project, the road and railway construction might also serve to create an 
inadequately optimistic image of a ‘progress’. This progress appears, when digging into 
Tibetan individual’s own evaluation of happiness and well-being, hallow, superficial at worst, 
and limited and misleading at best.  
‘Development’, as a normative term ought to says something about how a community, 
a region or a country has improved the quality of life of its citizens. If not taking the human 
rights situation in Tibet into account when evaluating the effects of ‘development’, I argue 
that we run the risk of obtaining an inadequate picture of the empirical reality on the ground.  
It could furthermore be argued that the practice of demanding special permits for 
people to travel freely within the borders of their own country of residency could be linked to 
Dahl’s first dimensional view of ‘power’. In the case posed by “Tenzin”, where he would 
need a special permit from the police to visit his parents in Lhasa, the first dimensional power 
would have been exercised where A (the Chinese police authority) would deny B (“Tenzin”, 
the Tibetan) the opportunity to visit his parents in Lhasa, in a situation where it would be in 
his interest to do so, for instance by not granting B the required travel permit. However, the 
first dimension of ‘power’ could also be seen as present in the reality which requires “Tenzin” 
to obtain the permits in the first place, regardless of its outcome. That is because, I argue, A 
(the Chinese authorities) makes B (“Tenzin”) to do something that he otherwise not have done 
out from his own free will, that is, approaching the Chinese authorities in order to obtain a 
permit. It would be in his interest to freely and without restrictions go to Lhasa or any other 
place within his own country, but because the first dimension of power seems to be exercised, 
he cannot do that, thus, the permits are required.  
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4.3 Interconnections of Education and Assimilation 
In this section of the analysis, I seek to present the findings regarding the next topic of my 
empirical findings. This topic addresses the perceptions of limitations in the access to 
education, combined with experiences of cultural assimilation. Although education perhaps 
has not played a major role in the overall Chinese development processes in Tibet, the topic 
was frequently discussed during the qualitative interviews used in this research project.  
As mentioned in the theoretical discussion of this thesis, education measured in 
literacy has become a conventional component of the mainstream development understanding 
after its importance was pointed out in the Human Development Report by the UN in the 
early 1990’s. Since then, literacy rates and enrollment in education have become an important 
component of how human development is measured, for instance, through the Human 
Development Index (HDI). Therefore, the findings regarding education should be understood 
as directly related to development, also in Tibet under the PRC. Many of my informants 
pointed out that they felt excluded from the existing educational opportunities in Tibet, 
although some acknowledged that improvements in education were a positive thing that had 
come with the Chinese involvement in the region. As my informant “Tsewang” stated:  
“Yes, it is actually true that the Chinese have improved the overall educational system 
in Tibet” (“Tsewang”, Interview Nr. 1) 
The vast majority of my informants stated that educational opportunities were one of several 
reasons why they had chosen to come to India. The majority of my informants pointed out 
that the Chinese language, and not the Tibetan, was utilized as the language of instruction in 
primary, secondary or tertiary educational institutions in their respective villages and towns. 
In some areas it appeared that the language of instruction at all levels of education in Tibet 
was Chinese, while in other areas, this was only the case up until a certain grade. For others 
again, the first cycles of schooling was thought in Tibetan, or a mix between Tibetan and 
Chinese. Many reflected about the practice of teaching in the Chinese language as a means to 
assimilate Tibetan culture into the Chinese. This reflection in line with practices described in 
conventional research on Indigenous People’s, where cultural assimilation in many historical 
contexts have been pursued through imposing bans on, or restricting the use of, the 
indigenous languages, for instance in educational contexts (Keels 2006, Dahre 2005). The 
following is a quote by the former political prisoner “Sonam”, who on my suggestion that the 
Chinese had improved the lives of Tibetans, stated: 
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 “It is correct, yes, that the government is providing infrastructure and schools, but 
you know, it’s not like the schools they build teach in the Tibetan language, it’s all 
Chinese, thus largely excluding us Tibetans from benefitting from them. The schools 
are primarily built for the Chinese immigrants that have come to Tibet in recent times, 
you know, not for the sake of the Tibetans as it might appear to you, foreigners. So on 
the one side, on the surface, I agree it can look like the Chinese government are doing 
good to the Tibetans. However, in my opinion, it seems more like the aim of the good 
facilities and development that comes with the Chinese, is actually to make the Tibetan 
culture, or I mean, our ways of life, our traditions, you know, to disappear into the 
Chinese. Yes, I think the real reason behind for instance the housing policies, is to 
change the Tibetan… well, the Tibetan mind set so that it will become like the 
Chinese… That’s their first priority. Destroy the Tibetan customs. The new buildings 
and schools that they build is not for the Tibetans, but for Chinese immigrants. The 
education serves to assimilate Tibetans into Chinese, just look at how they try to teach 
us history and politics too, it’s like political propaganda! They are not teaching about 
the real world out there, or base their curriculum on independent, internationally 
acknowledged facts, you know, it’s more like the re-educations programs…It’s not like 
they give us the real information about the outside world! And then, in Chinese too, so 
what’s the use?!” (“Sonam” Interview 11). 
“Sonam’s” quote above is interesting for in several ways for the research topic addressed in 
this thesis. He points out that 1) he experiences the newly built schools and buildings as 
something which are not aimed at the use of the local Tibetans, but rather for the Chinese 
immigrants, and 2) that he sees not only the school system and the house policies, but also 
what he generally terms ‘the good facilities’ which come with development, as a means to 
assimilate the Tibetan ‘mindset’, lifestyle and language into the Chinese. In that way, he 
seems to experience the Chinese overall development policies in Tibet nearly as a strategy of 
assimilation in itself. 
This is particularly interesting when taking a look at the history of the world’s 
indigenous peoples (Dahre 2005, Keal 2003, Coates 2004). Coates argues that after the 
Second World War, a new “era of government intervention” began which affected how 
nation-states treated their respective indigenous peoples (2004). This new tendency was 
“(…)built around the belief that social and economic policies could speed indigenous 
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assimilation into national norms (Coates 2004:222). This led to many indigenous peoples 
being subjected to new forms of force and suppression. However,  
“The tools were now government housing projects and economic development schemes rather 
than military construction activities and armed invasions. Armed aggression had been replaced 
by the gentler, but equally pernicious intrusions of the ideologies of assimilation and cultural 
suppression. New armies – of teachers, social service workers, medical professionals, 
economic development officers – made their way into the tribal territories, offering assured 
routes into the prosperity and security of life and property enjoyed by other members of the 
national society. These missionaries of the new order (…) sought to “improve” the indigenous 
condition, even if it meant undermining traditional lifeways (Coates 2004).  
 
When I suggested to “Tenzin”, the same question posed to “Sonam” above, that the CCP had 
improved the living conditions to Tibetans thorough financial support, he answered: 
“According to my own experiences in Tibet, yes, it is true that the Chinese were giving 
some money to Tibetans for their livelihood, but ultimately our rich heritage and 
culture and tradition, what they are trying to do is to make it weaker and weaker year 
by year. Therefore, for instance in my own village, they gave some money so that the 
rural people themselves could for instance work as Chinese police and wear the 
uniform, so in that way they (the Chinese) could give some wages. But in the real 
sense our own heritage and culture is something they try to weaken in our daily lives”. 
For instance, in the monasteries they have made certain rules and regulations which 
did not exist before. Before, everyone could join the monastic institutions as a monk or 
a nun, but after that they made these new rules and regulation, only a limited number 
of people are permitted to enter the monasteries and nunneries each year. So, in that 
sense there are restrictions of the population in the monasteries. That was one 
example. Another example is for instance that for children, there are not good 
opportunities to learn their own language properly, and to learn modern education in 
Tibetan. So in that sense, we do not have freedom in the monastic institutions, and 
when it comes to schooling. That is how I feel about it.” (“Tenzin”, Interview 5).  
Later in the interview, after having discussed much about different aspects of culture and 
assimilation, I asked him how he thought the conditions in Tibet could be improved for the 
better. He answered:   
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“(…)I mean, in Tibet, the culture is very important, you see, not like other places. So I 
hope that the conditions in Tibet could change so that we could all practice all aspects 
of Tibetan culture, religion and language freely. In Tibet I had no opportunities to go 
to school, but here in India, I am in a free country, so such opportunities exist here. 
That is why I hope to go to school when I am here in this free country” (“Tenzin”, 
Interview 5). 
Interestingly, thus, “Tenzin” appears to pull a direct link between political freedom and access 
to education.  
 
4.4 Political Repression and the Process of Fleeing to Exile 
Public participation in politics has come to play an increasingly important role within 
Development Studies during recent years, for instance related to the debates on concepts like 
‘ownership’ and ‘good governance’. Green and Chambers, for instance, in their work entitled 
“The Politics of Participation in Sustainable Development Governance”, argue that “(…) a 
crucial distinction exists between participation and influence; the former is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the latter” (2006:). In the case of Tibet, I argue that both aspects 
appears to be absent for the average local individual. Few political ‘spaces’ exists where 
ordinary Tibetans could raise their voice against the Chinese government or the policies of the 
CCP. And as the above quote suggests, where there is no possibilities for political 
participation on decision making levels or grass roots organization, political influence is 
necessarily halted. One could therefore argue that a politically repressive and authoritarian 
society, with heavy restrictions on civil and political rights, as well as with severe limitations 
in freedom of speech and assembly, is likely to restrict this aspect of human development. 
Therefore, although political repression at first glance might not appear to be of direct 
relevance for our understanding of the Chinese development processes in Tibet, I still argue 
that our analyses would be inadequate and misleading if this crucial aspect of the Tibetan 
society was ignored in a critical study like this.  
However, in order to elaborate on this point of view, I argue that it here also becomes 
important to take into account theories of popular resistance and political dissent.  That, I 
argue, is because popular resistance and political dissent potentially can widen our 
understanding about the levels and signals of local discontent towards the PRC in general and 
towards the CCP development policies in general. This in turn, I argue, is not only relevant 
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for both the fact that Tibetans flee to a state of exile, but also for the reasons behind single 
individual’s reasons for fleeing. I will in this section show how the phenomenon of Tibetans 
fleeing to India or Nepal could be seen as a form of political resistance.  
American social anthropologist and resistance researcher, James C. Scott shows in his 
work on peasant communities in Asia how resistance in severely repressive political contexts 
often is covert and hidden due to for instance fears of punishment, violence and further 
political repression (Scott 1990). Such forms of resistance, Scott argues, could therefore easily 
be overlooked, or even completely ignored, which potentially could deceive the power 
holders and the outside world to believe that the people are content and satisfied with their 
situations where in reality they are not (Scott 1990). It is therefore become crucial not to 
ignore the many, multifaceted shapes and faces of such forms of resistance, when analyzing 
something as politically charged and life-affecting as development processes in Tibet under 
the PRC. The wave of Tibetan self-immolations can clearly be seen as a very overt, visible 
and direct sign of resistance and discontent. In a way, the self-immolations could be seen as a 
strategy of creating a political ‘space’ that does not currently exist in Tibet. By taking the 
drastic step of engulfing their bodies in flames, after having handed out leaflets and flyers or 
shouted slogans of political contents, the self-immolators enable their political dissent to be 
heard and to be seen and to be experienced by others. Since the burnings also have reached, 
not only national headlines and debate within the PRC, but also headlines in the international 
media sphere, the self-immolations could be seen as an extremely painful way to reclaim their 
political voice as Tibetans and as an ethnic minority, that otherwise would have been taken 
away from them due to heavy political repression. So they are creating a political space, and 
reclaiming their political voice.  
Also in my interviews, I came across individuals with close experiences to some of the 
cases of self-immolations. My informant “Nyingche”, for instance, a young former monk and 
political refugee from Amdo, had shared room with his friend who self-immolated only 
months earlier: 
“I saw him self-immolating in front me, I was shocked! And scared… it made me sad! 
He hadn’t told anyone about his plans... A friend of mine first spotted him doing it, 
then he called me, and I came running. He shouted slogans saying he wanted human 
rights in Tibet, and that the Dalai Lama should come back to Tibet. After fifteen 
minutes, the Chinese police came. But later, perhaps one or two thousand people had 
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come and gathered at the spot, and so, we managed to prevent the police to take his 
body. The police are really strict for the people who want to go to the funerals. Some 
get arrested at later stages” (“Nyingche”, Interview Nr. 4).  
When I asked him why he thought that some people chose to self-immolate instead of doing 
more conventional forms of political protests such as demonstrations, protest vigils and 
advocacy work, which would include less sacrifices and suffering for the individual protestor, 
he answered: 
“As I see it, to self-immolate would actually not include more human suffering than 
what it would be to be imprisoned by the Chinese for years, which would be a likely 
result if we did such political acts you mentioned. Prison includes torture. And being 
tortured for, let’s say, twenty years, or… even life time… would include more lasting 
suffering than the burning of one’s own body… It might sound strange, but… in my 
view, if we compare the self-immolations and the Chinese prison life, to self-immolate 
would be better. That is because the pain then at least would end quickly, at the same 
time as the statement would have been made.” (“Nyingche, Interview Nr. 4).  
But what about the quiet, small-scale Scottian of everyday forms resistance, and what can that 
potentially tell us about the Chinese development policies in Tibet (Scott 1979, Scott 1985, 
Scott 1990)? If the material living standards have become so much better in Tibet, and the 
Tibetans thus “are the happiest people in China” like the CCP suggests, why do hundreds of 
Tibetans every year risk their lives leaving Tibet illegally into exile? Perhaps improved 
material living standards do not necessarily mean that local Tibetans feel that their human 
well-being and contentment is improved, at least if other societal aspects are not improved at 
the same time?  Perhaps there are other aspects of life that are valued higher than improved 
material conditions among many Tibetans? And what is it that the people who leave Tibet 
hope to achieve in India, that they do not feel they are able to obtain in Tibet? I argue that the 
reasons behind Tibetan refugee’s decisions of leaving to India, and their aspirations for their 
new lives in exile, potentially could shed valuable insights into aspects of the local 
perceptions and reflections on the Chinese development processes in Tibet, and experiences 
of increased ‘well-being’.  
 This section thus deals with the findings related to the personal processes of leaving 
Tibet; the backgrounds for my informant’s choices of fleeing; their expectations of their 
journey ahead of leaving Tibet; as well as their practical experiences of escaping. How much 
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hardship did they experience while fleeing, and what do that tell us about the Tibetan 
sentiments towards the CCP in general, and the PRC rule in particular? I will in the following 
case present some of the findings from a double-interview with two young Tibetan males that 
clearly demonstrate how far the local anger and discontent about ‘the Chinese’ could reach:  
4.4.1  Case 1) Expectations and Experiences of Fleeing: “Only The Bad 
Chinese, I Would Stab” 
My informants “Tashi” and “Norbu” were in a different situation than my other informants in 
several ways. Firstly, they were the only ones coming from a remote rural area in western 
Tibet, TAR. Secondly, they had not come as far as to Dharamsala when we did the interview, 
thus, they were in practice still in the process of travelling. It had passed 21 days since they 
left Tibet, and when I met them, they had just reached a Tibetan refugee camp in a large, 
Indian city, located some ten hours’ drive from Dharamsala. In order to protect their 
identities, I will not mention the name of the city in this thesis. 
“Tashi” (19) and “Norbu” (20) were childhood friends, both from traditional nomadic 
families. And their enthusiasm over finally being in a Tibetan camp in India, with Dharamsala 
close ahead, was evident (“Tashi” &”Norbu”, Interview 9&10). As they knew each other so 
well, they were constantly interrupting each other, and at times, coming with ironic and 
humorous comments on each other’s behalf. However, there was also an underlying 
seriousness about their appearances, they looked exhausted, and were constantly complaining 
about how much their legs and bodied ached due to the many weeks of walking. When I 
asked them how their travel from Tibet to India had been thus far, the following quote is a 
summary of their collective testimony:  
“Oh! Too much hardships and suffering! For several days we walked with snow up to 
here [“Tashi” says, while showing a gesture marking a line up to above the knees]. But 
look! Not even a scratch! [Says “Norbu”]We went to India to see the Dalai Lama, he 
is like the Sun of the Universe, the grate protector of everything. Yes, a bit like a sun 
shining down with his protection for on all the people and the plants from the sky 
[“Tashi” takes up a small, laminated photography of the Dalai Lama in a thread around 
his neck]! I got this some years ago, from a relative who had been to Dharamsala. So 
I slept with it under my pillow each night for protection, and it worked! Because now 
we are in India! In Freedom! You see, the Chinese are not being good to us back in 
Tibet. But, now we don’t care. Now it’s all worth it. We didn’t die of hunger. Or from 
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the cold! We weren’t shot dead. Yes, we must have been protected by the Gods! By His 
Holiness, the fourteenth Dalai Lama! Oh, but it was simply too cold… When we slept, 
our cloths and the shoes stuck to the ground because it had frozen. We put nail polish 
on our nails to protect them from the cold, but see! [“Norbu” shows me his deformed 
finger nails with traces of purple nail polish]. We were afraid the nails would fall off, 
but luckily they are all still here! [Looks at his friend, who giggle and nods 
confirmatively]. Yes, it must have been the nail polish. We didn’t tell anyone that we 
left. Not even our parents. Yes, perhaps they now think that we ran away? Or maybe 
that we died! But it’s very important when travelling abroad not to forget ones parents 
[putting on a song on mobile phones about ama-la and pha-la]. To see the Dalai Lama 
would be like a dream! Yes, when we go back to Tibet we will bring a lot of these 
things to our friends in Tibet, photos of the Dalai Lama and his books, and give it to 
all the people!”  
When I then asked if they had to be careful while spreading photos of Dalai Lama, “Norbu” 
answered, while pointing at his phone:  
 “This Khampa singer with such a strong and powerful voice, he is very young, but he 
has been arrested many times! Yes, all the time he spends in prison! If the police found 
out that I had this song on my phone, they would arrest me of course. Before, it was 
possible to get a hold of such things like small photos of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, but 
not anymore. In Tibet, all the people want the Dalai Lama to come back! We love him 
so much!”. 
After some time talking to them, I asked what they believed would have happened to them if 
the police found them while fleeing over the mountains. They answered: 
“If they caught us, Hu! What do you think?! They would cut off our hands and legs!” 
[demonstrating gesture like cutting off the legs]! Or perhaps rip out our eyes! 
[demonstrating gesture ripping out his left eye]! Yes, perhaps they would hang us up to 
the wall by the arms and beat us with a stick! [Pull both of his arms out like a crucified 
Jesus, and then pretend to beat with a stick]. Before we left Tibet, we had bought two 
big knives. Our plan was to stab any Chinese police we would meet on our way, like 
this [demonstrating gesture, like stabbing someone with a knife]! What else could we 
do to protect ourselves?! [“Tashi, nodding to confirm his friend’s statement]. We 
thought… if we met perhaps… let’s say a maximum three… or four Chinese police or 
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army, we would stab tem. If they were more, we would be in too big trouble! We slept 
with the knives under our heads each night in case something bad would happen! We 
were so afraid. One time I even told him [“Norbu”nodding towards “Tashi”] that I 
thought we should go back! Yes, I really just wanted to return. The journey was too 
hard. But he insisted we should continue to walk.” 
Rather surprised and chocked of their comments of restorting to violence in the face of the 
Chinese police, I asked if it perhaps could be so that the Chinese police would have guns. 
They answered:  
 “No, come on, they would of course first ask us what we were doing out there in the 
mountains, right? And then, if we would answer we were going to see the Dalai Lama 
in India, they would of course shoot us. But if we managed to convince them that we 
were doing something else, they would only arrest us, you know.”  
I then said that I had heard that the Dalai Lama was very much pro nonviolence and against 
any form of harming Chinese people and all other living beings. They confirmed that position, 
and got a slightly embarrassed expression: 
 “Only a bad Chinese we would stab. Any good Chinese we would of course not 
harm”. Oh, when we reached the Indian border in safety, haha! We were so happy. 
We shook hands and stabbed our knives in the earth right there at the border line! 
Then, we left behind all of our warm cloths and went on walking. We followed the 
river, that’s how we reached our destination. In total, there are twenty-two days since 
we left the village in Tibet. Here in India, we only took the bus for one day. The rest of 
the time, we have been walking on foot. Yes, our legs still hurts! Oh, so badly! We 
have been begging people for food these days, here and elsewhere. People didn’t want 
our money [Yuan, the Chinese currency]! Every time we saw someone with food, we 
tried to ask them if we could get some of it, we gave them Yuan but they all refused. 
They didn’t understand what we were trying to say, or what it was that we gave them! 
You know… if a body does not get food… it cannot longer walk properly... It starts to 
tremble and can’t walk in straight lines… We have had hard times... The first time we 
ate Indian food, we threw it all up, although it was only rice! But when we see the 
Dalai Lama here in India, it would be like a dream come true, it wouldn’t matter if we 
died tomorrow!” 
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“Norbu” and “Tashi’s” testimony and experience illustrated in the quotes above, I argue,  
indicates the existence of an extreme resistance and discontent towards the PRC in general, 
and its restrictions of the freedom of religion in particular. They obviously had been through 
hard times while fleeing, exposing themselves to great inconveniences, discomforts, fear and 
uncertainties. Their testimony also says something about how important religion and the Dalai 
Lama appears to be to Tibetans, although that does not necessarily mean that they would 
follow and live by all the aspects in the Dalai Lama’s religious teachings. Unlike my other 
informants, it was the desire to see the Dalai Lama alone which motivated them to leaving 
Tibet, and they also intended to return at some point. How they planned to do that, and 
whether or not they will/have succeed(ed) remains uncertain. Religious freedom appears, out 
from the findings in this interview, to be extremely crucial to the experience of human well-
being and happiness in the case of “Tashi” and “Norbu”.  
4.4.2 Case 2) Experiences of Political Repression: “There Where Pieces of 
Thorn Monk Robes in a Corner, and Traces of Blood on the Walls” 
As several of my informants were political refugees, previously having spent months, and 
even years, in prison, I got the opportunity to get some details and insights into what kind of 
political activities which would lead to what kind of punishments by the Chinese police. My 
informant “Sonam”, for instance, was sentenced 18 months in various prisons in Tibet after 
having been caught in participating in a demonstration in connection to the 2008 uprisings in 
his home town: 
“They [the Chinese staff in prison] asked me “who started these protests?!” and “who made 
you participate in these protests?!”. […]One time they hang me up by the wrists to the roof in 
the room, I think it was to make me confess. One of my hands was broken, it was painful [he 
takes up his wrists and shows me his visible scars]. After three months, one or two Chinese 
came and dislocated my handles. I was so week and badly treated I couldn’t eat, I had no 
appetite, and difficulties swallowing, […]and my mouth was full of bruises and wounds […]. 
Several times, when I asked them to take me to a hospital, they refused. They said “you are 
anti-Chinese, you are not allowed to leave the prison to go to hospital!”. […]They used to say 
“you, anti-Chinese! You love the Dalai Lama, perhaps he gave you food to make you 
protest?!” (“Sonam”, Interview 11).  
Another example is my informant “Dadul”, a young man in his early twenties from a village 
in Amdo. He had been caught by the Chinese police when handing out political leaflets in the 
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main square in his town. The leaflets included slogans for human rights and democracy in 
Tibet, and for the return of the Dalai Lama. This is a summary of his personal narrative: 
 
“I wanted people to know how important it is with rights and democracy, and because 
I knew that others were demonstrating because of the Olympic Games, I too wanted to 
do something to contribute. […] The police came after a while, they beat me so I fell 
to the ground and lost the leaflets in the street. I didn’t know what they were going to 
do to me, you see, it happens quite often that the police take random people in the 
street and, then, they are lost forever, not even their families get to know what happens 
to them. I feared something like that would happen to me, you know. They beat me 
with their metallic sticks in the front of everybody, then they dragged me to the police 
car and shuffled me inside. They took me to a place I didn’t know, but I was so badly 
beaten and scared that I couldn’t think clearly. That prison that they took me to, I 
can’t remember everything in details, however, I ended up in a small cell without 
window, somehow. I just remember that I woke up there in that cell, so I assume I must 
have passed out at some point. When I opened my eyes, there were a number of 
Chinese police officers just walking calmly around me in circles while smoking 
cigarettes, they didn’t say much, really, and that gave me enough time to see that cell 
and what it looked like. There was thorn robes of monks and nuns there at the floor, 
lying in the corner, full of something that looked like blood stains. And blood, yes, 
there were big traces of blood on the walls too, and on the floor there were a pair of 
broken handcuffs. I won’t give you the details of what happened there, but I passed out 
several times due to their beatings and the instruments that they used. One time they 
put my head in a bucket of water so I thought they were going to drown me. They 
asked many questions, they said they didn’t believe I had wrote those slogans on those 
leaflets myself because they said there was no way I would know anything about such 
things like human rights, they wanted me to say that someone abroad had forced me to 
do it. (“Dadul”, Interview 13). 
4.4.3 Fleeing Tibet as a Small Scale Form of ‘Everyday Resistance’ 
Most of the informants mentioned a variety of different reasons behind their decisions of 
leaving Tibet. This is understandable, I argue, considering the many potential problems, 
dangers and difficulties which also are involved in leaving one’s home county to a new and 
uncertain life as a stateless refugee in India, regardless of the potential dangers of staying. 
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Most informants felt it emotionally challenging to leave their family, and close friends. And 
although all expressed relief of having come to India in safety, many also felt anxious and 
worried about what their new lives in exile would bring.  
However, a limited number of informants stated that political repression was the 
unique reason for coming to India. These where all political refugees who faced direct threats 
of further repression, arrests, or human rights abuses like torture and other forms of violence, 
or who were subjected to extreme forms of political monitoring by the Chinese police upon 
release from prison. However, all of the informants nevertheless considered themselves as 
refugees, although only the former political prisoners considered themselves as political 
refugees in particular.  
None of my informants where unaware of the personal risks and dangers involved in 
the practical process of leaving Tibet. The majority of them had ahead of leaving Tibet heard 
of individuals who had been shot, tortured, imprisoned, or deported by Chinese or Nepali 
police as a result of being caught in the mist of fleeing. All of my informants stated that they 
knew before they left Tibet that there would be no certainty of whether or not they would 
actually succeed in crossing the border to Nepal, or getting to India. Only one of my 
informants had left Tibet legally by flight with official travel documents. This was the 35 year 
old woman “Tsewang” who told me she was “lucky” to have a distant family member 
working in the Chinese police force in Lhasa. In that way she was able to, through her 
contacts and through bribery, obtain an official Chinese passport and other required 
documents which enabled her and her sister to go to India without exposing themself to great 
personal risks (“Tsewang”, Interview 1).  
Except two young, male childhood friends from western Tibet who had fled on their 
own as a spontaneous impulse to fulfill their dream of seeing the Dalai Lama, directly over 
the mountains from Tibet to India: the rest had all left Tibet for India via Nepal. This was 
done with a so-called ‘guide’. These are Tibetans who have previously been to India 
themselves, thus knowing how to get there presumingly without being caught. Due to the 
dangers involved in the process of fleeing, and the additional dangers of aiding other Tibetans 
to flee to exile, the fees these guides charge were, according to my informants, very high.  
  The majority of the interviewees had first traveled to Lhasa in order to find a guide 
willing to take them through the border. My informants stated that they paid from 10 500 
Yuan and up to as much as 28 000 Yuan as payments to these guides. Most of my informants 
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experienced this as a considerable financial burden, as many of them were nomads with 
limited financial resources. Many had therefore taken on paid labor in Lhasa, working for 
several months in order to be able to pay the required fees. Others had to borrow from various 
family members. Many even stated that they also when having reached the Tibetan Reception 
Center in Nepal continued to feel unsafe, and feared that the Nepali police would come and 
arrest them so that they could hand them over to the Chinese authorities.  
Many applied sophisticated strategies of how they had been able to fool both Chinese 
and Nepali police and other authorities, during the fleeing as well as upon arrival to Nepal, in 
order to succeed with their traveling and avoid problems.  
For instance, several of the political refugees that I interviewed had faced severe 
challenges of surveillance upon release from prison due to something they called “political 
restrictions”. This implies amongst other things that former political prisoners are required to 
do weekly reports to the local police stations, scheduling their movements, travelling, work 
situation, day-to-day activities, and overall actions as a means of monitoring. Furthermore, 
they were also required to have special SIM-cards which were being closely monitored by the 
military and the police. This situation obviously poses a severe challenge to the practical 
matter of fleeing, which must happen in the secret. However, several of the political refugees 
solved these problems by convincing their local police that they planned to go to the nomadic 
areas, which normally are highly remote, mountainous regions, thus without police stations, 
phone, or internet coverage, to work as nomads, while what they really did was to flee into 
exile. Other informants experienced robberies and thefts by Nepali military when having 
crossed the border. One informant told me how had heard about this problem before he left 
his village, and had thus tried to solve this potential issue by rolling the little cash that he had 
in metal foil and stuffed it in a tube of tooth paste. 
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5. Conclusion  
This thesis has critically discussed and analyzed the Chinese development processes in Tibet 
out from a power and post-development theoretical framework. The analysis has been 
grounded on a number of empirical, qualitative, in-depth interviews with Tibetan recent 
arrived refugees during a four month fieldwork in Dharamsala, northern India. This particular 
group of informants stands in a unique position as they enjoy from the freedom of speech and 
expression in India, while at the same time having direct, first-hand experiences from the 
ongoing situation in Tibet. In line with the critical tradition of a post-development theoretical 
logic, my attempt has been to scrutinize to which extent, and in which ways, the practical 
undertaking of Chinese development policies in Tibet could be seen as exercising different 
forms of ‘power’. This has been a necessary approach in order to adequately understand the 
other aim of scrutiny of this thesis: to which extent the Chinese development processes in 
Tibet have been successful in winning popular support by Tibetans, and why.   
The empirical findings of this research project have first and foremost addressed four 
different aspects relevant to the understanding of development in Tibet under the PRC. These 
have been 1) the Comfortable Housing Program, 2) the limited benefits of highway 
infrastructure construction, 3) limited access to education, and assimilation, as well as 4) 
political repression, and the reasons for fleeing from Tibet. We have seen that the Chinese 
development policies in Tibet have not been successful in winning a high degree of popular 
support among the Tibetans interviewed in this study.  
The Comfortable Housing Program was seen as a mere ‘show off’ for the CCP to gain 
outside recognition. The large investments in high way and railway infrastructure was seen as 
disconnected from human well-being and ‘development’, and its potentially positive impacts 
on the ‘agency’ and individual freedoms for local Tibetans were halted and diminished by the 
excessive presence of military checkpoints, general travel restrictions for Tibetans and 
increased demands for special travel permits to do short and long distance travel within the 
country. While some informants stated that they thought the CCP had improved the school 
system so a certain extent, the majority felt excluded from taking on basic and higher 
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education up to certain grades because the language of instruction continued to be in Chinese 
instead of Tibetan. This could be seen as a strategy of cultural and linguistic assimilation, and 
many informants felt that the CCP and the PRC did not show sufficient respect, interest or 
regard of the Tibetan culture, language and traditional values. This could be put in a larger 
historic context where many indigenous peoples living as ethnic minorities under strong 
nation-states like the PRC, has been subjected to similar practices of assimilation through 
language. Political repression should not be seen in isolation to development processes, as 
political participation has become an important field of scrutiny within Development Studies. 
In the case of Tibet, severe limitations in basic civil and political rights, leading among other 
things to what appears to be a complete lack of ‘political spaces’ where local Tibetans 
legitimately and openly could have expressed their political views and aspirations. In that way 
political repression could be seen as a severe obstacle to aspects of human development. A 
large variety of different kinds of power was exercised in the implementation of certain CCP 
development project. This is a contradiction to their expressed strategy of putting ‘people 
first’ in their current development campaign in Tibet. Fleeing Tibet could be seen as a form of 
political resistance, and the ongoing wave of self-immolations could be seen as a way in 
which Tibetans attempt to regain their ‘political voice’, as well as creating a ‘political space’ 
which do not appear to be possible in many other ways.  
Although other relevant and interesting aspects of the Chinese development policies in 
Tibet could have been addressed and scrutinized, these topics evolved as the most central 
empirical findings in this particular research project. In order to obtain a complete and 
comprehensive picture of the multifaceted and complex meanings and implications of the 
Chinese development policies in Tibet, I argue that further research is required.  
This thesis has argued that power is a multifaceted concept, and has distinguished four 
different forms of such. The first and less complex form is seen as the first-dimensional power 
(Dahl), presented as ‘an intuitive understanding’ of the term, or ‘power over’. We have seen 
how the second-dimensional power view (Bacharach and Baratz) radically broadens up the 
term by also taking into account the decision making process, and the process of deciding 
what would be put on the political agenda. The third-dimensional kind of power (Lukes) 
furthers the power debate beyond the decision making table, arguing that conflicts of interest 
which do not reach the decision making level also could entail exercises of power, thus 
elaborating on our understanding of ‘conflict’. The fourth form of power is seen as 
‘discursive’ (Foucault): a subtle, sophisticated and almost omnipresent ‘power’ which shapes 
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our actions, thinking and reflections, amongst other things through ‘discourses of truth’. Such 
discourses could also be understood as taken-for-granted assumptions, norms and valuations 
which are not subjected to adequate problematization.  
We have also seen how the term ‘development’ is a highly subjective concept, with 
differing and contested definitions. This thesis has argued that practical and theoretical 
development work should not be seen as freed from underlying ideological assumptions as 
well as normative valuations, although ‘development’ sometimes presents itself as a 
politically and value-neutral pursuit of increased human ‘well-being’. Precisely because of the 
‘unquestioned desirability’ of development: it becomes particularly relevant to analyze the 
concept according to power-theories.  
I could have grounded this study on a larger amount of previous empirical research on 
development in Tibet. However, due to the sensitive nature of my research topic, I found it 
more appropriate and important to elaborate on the use and application of power and post-
development theory, as I see that there has existed a gap in the existing literature with this 
regards.  
The post-development school of thought has highlighted that what is considered to be 
‘increased human well-being’ might differ radically from community to community. By 
relating the development concept to the history of colonialism, the post-development school 
of thought argues that it often exists a difference between the normative valuation of ‘human 
well-being’ among powerful nation-states, and the normative valuation of ‘human well-being’ 
among the respective indigenous populations and ethnic minorities. The empirical findings in 
this thesis, dealing with the Chinese development processes in Tibet, support this theoretical 
position. The nation-states normally have the agency, decision-making power and financial 
resources to hand out practical development projects on the ground. This in turn, might at 
worst result in a decreased human agency, a violation on human dignity and a diminishing 
effect on indigenous empowerment. This appears to some extent to be the case in terms of 
development in Tibet under the CCP.  
This research suggests that the Chinese development policies in Tibet have failed in 
winning high levels of popular support among Tibetans on the ground. This is interesting 
because it is the Tibetans whom these policies assumingly are meant to benefit. The majority 
of the Tibetan informants interviewed in this project demonstrated high levels of skepticism, 
and discontent towards the Chinese development policies. The ‘unquestioned desirability’ of 
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development, which is seen in this thesis as a Foucaultian ‘discourse of truth’, could be have 
been utilized by the CCP in winning broadened outside recognition of their housing policies 
in general and of the overall development processes in Tibet in particular. However, if the 
CCP sees the economic policies and the CHP in Tibet as a strategy to ease Tibetan discontent 
towards the PRC government through enhancing the quality of lives for Tibetans, this 
research indicates that they have failed in that pursuit. If the CCP aims at halting local Tibetan 
resistance against the PRC and their desire for greater autonomy and political freedoms, it is 
difficult to see how this could be pursued through the current practice of development policy 
implementation.  
This research indicates that the Tibetan discontent towards the PRC is not limit to 
failed economic policies and regional inequalities in economic growth and material well-
being. Several informants stated that they valued freedom and human rights higher than 
material comforts and economic improvements. The logic that human rights is promoted 
through economic growth and ‘development’ was met with incomprehension and suspicion 
among my informants. On the other side, certain interviewees argued that they say human 
capacities to be halted through the violations of human rights in general, and through the 
exclusion from educational opportunities in particular. Lack of freedom was seen as an 
obstacle to well-being and social improvements in Tibet. As stated in the above discussion, 
my informant “Tenzin” believed that the reason why he was able to take on education in India 
was because India, as compared to Tibet, had freedom and democracy. This logic strongly 
contradicts the CCP’s strategy of promoting ‘human rights’ through ‘development’. 
Furthermore, the heavy investments in high roads and railway infrastructure in Tibet 
has had a limited positive effect on the agency, well-being and happiness of single individual 
Tibetans. The right to freedom of movement is violated through increased restrictions on free 
travel; continued presence of military checkpoints; as well as through increased requirements 
of travel permits. Some informants saw these new and additional requirements as a result 
(‘punishment’) of the increased Tibetan popular resistance towards the PRC since 2011, 
exemplified with the wave of self-immolations. Most of my informants did not see how 
highway and railroad infrastructure construction related to ‘development’ and human well-
being at all.  
Some informants pointed out how the CCP grants financial aid and provides houses 
through the CHP through what by some was seen as ‘bribery’. By this, it was referred to the 
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conditions on which the aid and housing was offered. The conditions that were pointed out 
was that the recipients were obliged to sign written documents stating that they do not support 
the Dalai Lama, but that they support the work and policies of the CCP. Although further 
research is needed in order to find out the frequency and scope of such a practice, this could 
be seen as a way in which ‘development’ could be actively used to violate basic human rights 
such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  
Many expressed a deep desire to pursue modern education thought in the Tibetan 
language, and for many informants the limited educational opportunities was one of several 
reasons behind their decision of moving to India. As education and literacy are conventional 
components of the mainstream understandings of human development, this research thus 
shows that there seems to exist a relation between limited human development and motivation 
behind Tibetan’s choice for fleeing. However, no informants stated that educational 
repression and linguistic assimilation was the only reason behind their decision of leaving 
Tibet. By drawing on the theoretical work of resistance researcher James C. Scott, this thesis 
thus suggests that the case of Tibetans fleeing to India to pursue modern education thought in 
the Tibetan language, could be seen as a small-scale form of political ‘everyday resistance’.  
Statistically, the PRC and its development work in Tibet might appear to have had a 
remarkable positive effect for Tibetans. They have invested a massive amount of resources 
with the aim of enhance the development in Tibetan areas. Costly and prestigious 
development projects such as the construction of railways and high ways, the building of 
telephone lines, water systems, postal systems, free housing to Tibetan families and direct 
financial subsidies. This thesis does not reject that some of these investments and project 
might have had certain positive effects for the well-being of local Tibetans. What I do argue is 
that these statistics and figures seem to be misleading because they do not show the ways in 
which some of these policies are implemented and how the implementations are experienced 
by Tibetan recipients.  
This study has argued that increased insights into the practical effects of the Chinese 
development policies in Tibet could be drawn when human rights considerations are taken 
into account. The empirical findings in this research support the idea that the CCP have not 
been effective in improving the overall happiness and content of local people in Tibet. The 
existing realities of the continued waves of Tibetans fleeing to exile, as well as the wave of 
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Tibetan self-immolations, confirms this position. Freedom and the sense of being treated with 
respect and human dignity appears to be essential for the Tibetan experience of happiness. 
Drawing on Foucault’s position, I argue that ‘where there is power, there is 
resistance’. Undignified development without freedom, grounded in a sense of cultural 
superiority on the side of the major development agency – the CCP – which in addition stripes 
Tibetans of basic human rights and real ‘choices’: is arguably likely to 1) increase the Tibetan 
political resistance towards the PRC government; 2) strengthen the support for the exile cause 
for greater autonomy among individuals in Tibet and abroad; 3) result in outbursts of political 
anti-government protests; and even a possibility of 4) leading to more self-immolations.  
As a country which is characterized not only by immense economic progress, but also 
by a very poor human rights accord, it becomes inadequate to analyze development processes 
in isolation to the political and human repression on the ground. The intersections between 
development and human rights in the case of Tibet need to be addressed in further research.  
This study has demonstrated that human development should be seen as intrinsically 
connected to a feeling of human dignity and freedom. Further research is needed to broaden 
up these insights.  
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